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OVERTREATMENT AND INFORMED CONSENT:  
A FRAUD-BASED SOLUTION TO UNWANTED  
AND UNNECESSARY CARE 
ISAAC D. BUCK† 
ABSTRACT 
According to multiple accounts, the administration of American health care results in as 
much as $800 billion in wasted spending due largely to the provision of overly expensive, 
inefficient, and unnecessary services. Beyond inflicting fiscal pain on the nation’s pocketbook, 
this waste has no clinical benefit—and often results in unnecessary hospital stays, cascading 
follow-up procedures, and time-wasting inconvenience for American patients. But aside from 
the mere annoyance of unnecessary care, the administration of overtreatment—that is, unnec-
essary care in and of itself—causes harm to the patient. Excessive care is deficient care. Un-
necessary care risks potential medical error and infection, and often subjects the patient to 
excessive recovery and rehabilitation. In addition to the fiscal reasons, it is not a stretch to 
observe that it makes little or no sense for American patients to desire unnecessary care.  
But yet, as a general matter, today’s modern and patient-protective legal and bioethical 
framework governing American health care purportedly forcefully protects patients from un-
desirable care by requiring their informed consent before any procedure or service. The im-
portance of informed consent is well settled, and it is recognized as a sacred value in American 
health care. In law and bioethics, this value is so sanctified that in cases where providers fail 
to achieve informed consent, legal recourse is available for the wronged patient. 
The prevalence of overtreatment, when juxtaposed with the sanctity of informed consent, 
is a perplexing legal and policy-based problem. Specifically, this disconnect that results—
between the robust protection of informed consent and patient autonomy on one hand, and 
the nagging problem of undesirable and harmful overtreatment on the other—calls out for a 
reasoned legal resolution. While overtreatment plagues American health care, the legal acad-
emy has yet to creatively and sufficiently examine the role that the doctrine of informed con-
sent, when coupled with the enforcement tools employed by the Department of Justice, could 
play in reining in unnecessary care.  
This Article fills that gap. By suggesting a path forward that bolsters the legal force of 
informed consent to provide a patient-centered “backstop” and thereby prevent unnecessary 
procedures in American health care, this Article argues that a stronger version of informed 
consent must contain the answer to the intractable problem of overtreatment. Building on 
previous scholarship that sought to impose different legal and policy-based controls on pro-
viders to prevent overtreatment, this piece shifts the focus to the other side of the hospital bed, 
making clear that viable legal tools are available to the federal government and can be em-
ployed to protect patients from undesirable care. The patient’s protections can be expanded in 
an effort to limit the injurious effects of American overtreatment.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
“Unwanted treatment is American medicine’s dark continent. No 
one knows its extent, and few people want to talk about it. The U.S. 
medical system was built to treat anything that might be  
treatable . . . .”1 
In what has been called perhaps “the most influential magazine ar-
ticle of the past decade”2—and one year before American health care 
radically changed with the passage of the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”)3—bestselling author and surgeon 
Atul Gawande profiled the curious case of McAllen, Texas in The New 
Yorker.4 At the time, this border town, located in the county with “the 
lowest household income in the country,” was known for having the 
second-highest health care costs of any locality in the United States.5 
After searching extensively for the main driver of the high costs in 
McAllen, Gawande settled on a relatively simple cause: rampant 
                                                                                                                  
 1. Jonathan Rauch, How Not to Die, ATLANTIC (May 2013), http://www.theatlan-
tic.com/magazine/archive/2013/05/how-not-to-die/309277/. 
 2. Bob Kocher & Farzad Mostashari, Opinion, A Health Care Success Story, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/opinion/a-health-care-success-
story.html. 
 3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 4. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER (June 1, 2009), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/the-cost-conundrum. 
 5. Id. 
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overutilization of medical services.6 According to Gawande, “Compared 
with patients in El Paso and nationwide, patients in McAllen got more 
of pretty much everything—more diagnostic testing, more hospital 
treatment, more surgery, more home care.”7 The data were striking.8 
In the years that followed health reform in 2010, and after 
Gawande’s “article became mandatory reading in the White House,”9 
the amount and cost of health care in McAllen radically changed; its 
Medicare Accountable Care Organization (“ACO”)—the Rio Grande 
Valley ACO—has reportedly saved $20 million annually with a focus 
on proper preventive care and increased coordination.10 Not only has 
the ACO saved money, but it has also improved health in the region;11 
it is undoubtedly an ACA “success story.”12 And McAllen should be 
viewed as a health reform success story, as well as an illustration of 
the structural change the ACA is seeking to make to the administra-
tion of American health care.  
But beyond the structural financial changes, the story of McAllen—
particularly the reality of the rampant overutilization of medical ser-
                                                                                                                  
 6. Id. But see New Health Care Spending Study Offers Rosier Picture of McAllen, 
MONITOR (Dec. 7, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.themonitor.com/news/local/new-health-care-
spending-study-offers-rosier-picture-of-mcallen/article_392a5740-b79d-5e21-abbb-
ac70041de82d.html (finding that spending for patients with private insurance was much 
lower than the Medicare population in McAllen). 
 7. Gawande, supra note 4.  
 8. See id. Specifically, the data indicated the extent to which McAllen patients were 
overtreated:  
Medicare patients received almost fifty per cent more specialist visits in 
McAllen than in El Paso, and were two-thirds more likely to see ten or 
more specialists in a six-month period. In 2005 and 2006, patients in 
McAllen received twenty per cent more abdominal ultrasounds, thirty 
per cent more bone-density studies, sixty per cent more stress tests with 
echocardiography, two hundred per cent more nerve-conduction studies 
to diagnose carpal-tunnel syndrome, and five hundred and fifty per cent 
more urine-flow studies to diagnose prostate troubles. They received one-
fifth to two-thirds more gallbladder operations, knee replacements, 
breast biopsies, and bladder scopes. They also received two to three times 
as many pacemakers, implantable defibrillators, cardiac-bypass opera-
tions, carotid endarterectomies, and coronary-artery stents. And Medi-
care paid for five times as many home-nurse visits. The primary cause of 
McAllen’s extreme costs was, very simply, the across-the-board overuse 
of medicine.  
Id. 
 9. Kocher & Mostashari, supra note 2. 
 10. See Christy Daggett, ACA Cost Saving Measures Help Turn McAllen, Texas from 
National Basket Case to Bellwether in Five Years, ME. CTR. ECON. POL’Y (Sept. 25, 2014), 
http://blog.mecep.org/2014/09/aca-cost-saving-measures-help-turn-mcallen-texas-from- 
national-basket-case-to-bellwether-in-five-years/; see also Kocher & Mostashari, supra  
note 2. 
 11. See id.  
 12. Id.  
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vices—can also serve as an illustration of a related and pervasive prob-
lem that poses an “enormous” but “largely hidden” challenge to Amer-
ican health care.13 Most notably, McAllen highlights the current legal 
mismatch—and, perhaps, deficiency—that exists in American health 
care between patients and providers when it comes to devising and 
administering health care in modern America. It raises a compelling 
question focused on how, exactly, America’s purportedly patient-pro-
tective and patient-centered health system is tolerant of such excess—
particularly when that excess does not lead to better health, is likely 
harmful,14 and when American patients themselves feel that they are 
too often overtreated by health care providers.15  
After the extensive comparison data Gawande presented, showing 
that McAllen patients underwent multiple times more care than their 
counterparts in El Paso 800 miles to the northwest, the story of 
McAllen clearly serves as an illustration of the uniquely American 
problem of overtreatment—for which, at least to date, legal solutions 
have been focused on the provider’s side of the hospital bed, and not 
the patient’s. Ultimately, McAllen is not only an exemplar of the im-
portance of preventive and coordinated care, but it is also the story of 
how little legal investment has been made in arming the patient to 
protect himself from overtreatment in the modern American health 
care system.  
Even as America’s health care system experiences an unprece-
dented slowdown in overall cost growth16—the likes of which has never 
                                                                                                                  
 13. Peter Eisler & Barbara Hansen, Doctors Perform Thousands of Unnecessary Sur-
geries, USA TODAY (June 20, 2013, 1:34 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/ 
2013/06/18/unnecessary-surgery-usa-today-investigation/2435009/. 
 14. Tara Parker-Pope, Overtreatment Is Taking a Harmful Toll, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.  
27, 2012, 2:37 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/27/overtreatment-is-taking-a- 
harmful-toll/?_r=0 (noting that overtreatment is “taking a human toll in pain, emotional suf-
fering, severe complications and even death”). 
 15. See discussion infra Sections III.B, III.C and accompanying notes. 
 16. The slowdown has accelerated since 2011. See Mary Agnes Carey, Think Health 
Care Costs Are Soaring? Think Again., CNN MONEY (Dec. 4, 2014, 12:19 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/04/news/economy/healthcare-costs/ (noting that for 2013, 
national health spending grew 3.6% from 2012—the lowest increase ever); Annie Lowrey, 
Slower Growth of Health Costs Eases Budget Deficit, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/us/politics/sharp-slowdown-in-us-health-care-
costs.html?_r=0 (“A sharp and surprisingly persistent slowdown in the growth of health 
care costs is helping to narrow the federal deficit . . . . The [Congressional B]udget [O]ffice 
now projects that spending on [Medicare and Medicaid] in 2020 will be about $200 billion, 
or 15 percent, less than it projected three years ago.”); Anne B. Martin et al., National 
Health Spending in 2012: Rate of Health Spending Growth Remained Low for the Fourth 
Consecutive Year, 33 HEALTH AFF. 67, 67 (2014), http://content.healthaffairs.org/ 
content/33/1/67.full (noting that the health spending rate increased 3.7% in 2012);  
Robert Pear, Growth of Health Spending Stays Low, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/us/health-spending-growth-stays-low-for-third-
straight-year.html (noting that health spending increased just 3.9% in 2011—at the time, 
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been seen17—it continues to administer and pay for care that is unnec-
essary at an eye-popping rate.18 A primary cause of the national debt,19 
America wastes at least $750 billion within its health care system each 
year—and about $210 million of that is specifically spent on “[u]nnec-
essary services.”20 Various examples of unnecessary services include 
administering multiple colonoscopies within ten years on the same pa-
tients, offering MRIs to patients who present with fainting spells but 
who have not experienced seizures, and overusing imaging and scan-
ning machinery for back pain.21 Exactly why the tool of informed con-
sent—a seemingly viable tool for limiting unnecessary health proce-
dures—has not been bolstered and utilized to address the prevalence 
of unnecessary procedures remains an unanswered question.22  
This analysis presents the idea that the doctrine of informed con-
sent can be used to address overtreatment and proposes a fraud-based 
                                                                                                                  
“the lowest annual rates recorded in the 52 years the government has been collecting such 
data”).  
 17. Lowrey, supra note 16 (“From 2009 to 2011, total health spending grew at the lowest 
annual pace since the government started keeping records 52 years ago . . . . In the 2012 
fiscal year, Medicare spending per beneficiary grew just 0.4 percent.”); see RICHARD  
KRONICK & ROSA PO, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GROWTH IN MEDICARE 
SPENDING PER BENEFICIARY CONTINUES TO HIT HISTORIC LOWS (2013), http://aspe.hhs.gov/ 
health/reports/2013/medicarespendinggrowth/ib.cfm.  
 18. See Eisler & Hansen, supra note 13 (“Tens of thousands of times each year, patients 
are wheeled into the nation’s operating rooms for surgery that isn’t necessary . . . .”); Tara 
Parker-Pope, Too Much Medical Care? N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2012, 12:20 PM), well.blogs.ny-
times.com/2012/07/25/too-much-medical-care/.  
 19. See Adrianna McIntyre, Solving the Mystery of Health-Care Prices Could Save $100 
Billion, VOX (May 21, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/5/21/5723452/could-more-
price-transparency-in-health-care-really-save-100-billion (showing the projected $41 trillion 
in health care spending). 
 20. See Sarah Kliff, We Spend $750 Billion on Unnecessary Health Care. Two Charts 
Explain Why., WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/09/07/we-spend-750-billion-on-unnecessary-health-care-two-
charts-explain-why/. 
 21. Brian Fung, How the U.S. Health Care System Wastes $750 Billion Annually, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/09/how-the-us-
health-care-system-wastes-750-billion-annually/262106/. 
 22. See Benjamin Moulton & Jamie S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-
Making: The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 95 (2010) (asking 
“[w]hy then do we tolerate a system that prevents identification of the ‘right’ patients due to 
insufficient information and avoidable ignorance? . . . Noting less than this disclosure fully 
complies with the provider’s legal and ethical obligation to the patient”). 
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tool to do so. Shifting from my previous analyses that identify the prob-
lems with,23 and a potential solution to,24 the current legal regulation 
of overtreatment, the analysis flips the focus to the patients’ side of the 
hospital bed. Assuming that no patient would, when well informed, 
voluntarily choose to undergo unnecessary treatment, informed con-
sent can provide a viable platform from which to launch a fraud-based 
enforcement regime, reliant particularly on the federal civil False 
Claims Act (“FCA”). Nevertheless, this piece does not purport to pro-
vide an answer to the often-thorny challenges associated with proving 
a lack of informed consent at trial;25 instead, it simply provides the 
legal framework for linking the doctrine to the Department of Justice’s 
(“DOJ”) enforcement tools. 
In other works, I have discussed the concerns inherent in using the 
fraud statutes—specifically the FCA—as the primary tools for regulat-
ing cases of overtreatment, particularly where the medical necessity 
or appropriateness of a given procedure is either in question or un-
clear. But where sufficient informed consent has not been achieved—
that is, it is demonstrable that the patient, had she been fully in-
formed, would have not elected to go through with a proposed therapy 
or procedure—the anti-fraud tools, and specifically the FCA, may be 
an attractive and effective tool to be used to provide a much-needed 
block to the administration of unnecessary care. This solution lacks 
the government-provider conflict that often characterizes other uses of 
the FCA in this context; indeed, when used to protect the patient’s 
wishes, many of the practically based concerns—such as “backdoor ra-
tioning” and government standard-setting—wither. Deficient in-
formed consent could constitute the platform necessary for a FCA ac-
tion—it is simply up to the DOJ to bring the cases, and  
the courts to interpret the FCA’s wide-ranging applicability. Under   
                                                                                                                  
 23. See generally Isaac. D. Buck, Caring Too Much: Misapplying the False Claims Act 
to Target Overtreatment, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 463 (2013) [hereinafter Buck, Caring Too Much] 
(highlighting the problems of the federal government’s solution of applying the FCA against 
providers who engage in overtreatment); Isaac D. Buck, Enforcement Overdose: Health Care 
Fraud Regulation in an Era of Overcriminalization and Overtreatment, 74 MD. L. REV. 259 
(2015) [hereinafter Buck, Enforcement Overdose] (arguing that the unique factors of over-
treatment enforcement, coupled with the easy resolution of health care fraud investigations 
lead to a risk of overuse). 
 24. See generally Isaac D. Buck, Breaking the Fever: A New Construct for Regulating 
Overtreatment, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1261 (2015) (arguing to improve America’s overtreat-
ment problem by shifting the focus from medical necessity to excess utilization and that the 
DOJ should pursue providers who are administering “too much” care). 
 25. These challenges may be difficult to overcome. For a summary of the proof chal-
lenges facing this framework, see infra Section V.C. 
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this scheme, providers and hospitals that administer overtreatment 
could open themselves up to fraud liability for a failure to secure suf-
ficient informed consent from each patient.26   
To date, a debate within the legal academy—a discussion that typ-
ically focuses on informed consent as a tool used to guarantee the 
wishes of the patient who is seeking a more expensive or complex pro-
cedure—has taken place.27 Academic hand wringing has largely fo-
cused on the insidious threat—typically from third parties—of limiting 
the rights of the patient to choose a more complex or expensive ther-
apy.28 The debate has presented the conflict as between the rights of 
the patient and the attempt of the insurance company or health man-
agement organization (“HMO”) to limit care to that patient.29  
However, this discussion has largely left out an analysis of the op-
posite and perhaps more pervasive current concern. Recent studies 
show that patients are subject to care they would not choose.30 Other 
data demonstrates an overtreatment crisis at the end of life.31 These 
concerns have caused some—particularly Professors Jamie King and 
Benjamin Moulton—to submit that, with a retooled and robust notion 
of informed consent that employs a shared decision-making model, 
more patients would elect to either decline unnecessary care or opt for 
less expensive care.32 But few have proposed a legal solution for bol-
                                                                                                                  
 26. This Article does not purport to define what “sufficient informed consent” is and 
how it should be achieved. That topic, although vitally important to this overall analysis, is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 27. See Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care 
Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 363 (1999) (“Much of the commentary assumes that 
fully informed patients will always opt for the more expensive therapy.”). 
 28. See generally Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 
511 (1997) (discussing the fundamental conflict between medical ethics and medical  
economics). 
 29. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 28, at 511; Krause, supra note 27, at 281-89.  
 30. See discussion infra notes 125-37 and accompanying text. 
 31. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
 32. See Krause, supra note 27, at 363 (noting that “informed decision making could, in 
theory, assist in health care cost containment efforts” and that “it is quite possible that a 
truly informed patient who is fully cognizant of the potential risks, benefits, and costs of the 
therapeutic options might instead choose to receive a less expensive but viable treatment”); 
Moulton & King, supra note 22, at 88 (“In the absence of complete information, individuals 
frequently opt for procedures they would not otherwise choose. Mounting clinical evaluative 
evidence suggests that the number of surgical procedures performed, even when justified by 
practice guidelines, actually exceeds patients’ desires when they are fully informed through 
a shared decision-making process.”); John E. Wennberg et al., Extending the P4P Agenda, 
Part 1: How Medicare Can Improve Patient Decision Making and Reduce Unnecessary Care, 
26 HEALTH AFF. 1564, 1566-67 (2007), http://content.healthaffairs.org/ 
content/26/6/1564.full.pdf+html (“Although the argument for informed patient choice is 
based on ethical principles of patient autonomy, the clinical trial data suggest that imple-
menting high-quality shared decision making could also result in Medicare savings via a 
drop in utilization.”). 
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stering informed consent to grow the doctrine—within the current le-
gal framework—so it can be used as a formidable tool against the 
threat of overtreatment within American health care.33 This Article 
undertakes both whether this is possible and points the way forward 
by linking informed consent to the government’s anti-fraud tools, ulti-
mately seeking to fill that gap.  
 This Article is organized in four parts. Part II provides an over-
view of the problem of overtreatment. Part III demonstrates and ex-
plores the reasons behind the conflict between robust informed consent 
doctrine and the data that show America’s major overtreatment prob-
lem. Part IV probes weaknesses in current informed consent doctrine 
and argues in support of a third-party informed consent remedy. Fi-
nally, Part V presents a plausible fraud-based theory of FCA liability.  
II.   THE PROBLEM 
America’s $210 billion spent on unnecessary services is caused by a 
number of factors,34 most of which are presented immediately below. 
Subsequently, the roles of three actors within the health care system—
and their potential responsibility for overtreatment—are highlighted. 
First, the health care delivery system requires a provider, who must 
suggest, recommend, or acquiesce in the provision of the unnecessary 
or nonbeneficial service; second, a patient, who must consent to the 
unnecessary or nonbeneficial service; and third, the payer that must  
  
                                                                                                                  
 33. A search within “law reviews and journals” on Westlaw for (“informed consent” /s 
“false claims act”) yielded just two articles—both of which gave a minor amount of focus to  
a fraud-based solution for care administered without informed consent. See Trudo  
Lemmens & Paul B. Miller, The Human Subjects Trade: Ethical and Legal Issues Surround-
ing Recruitment Incentives, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 398 (2003); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Cli-
nicians May Not Administer Life-Sustaining Treatment Without Consent: Civil, Criminal, 
and Disciplinary Sanctions, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 213, 277-79 (2013) (noting the 
viability of the FCA to cases involving a lack of informed consent). 
 34. See Buck, Caring Too Much, supra note 23, at 473-82; Buck, Enforcement Overdose, 
supra note 23. 
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approve and pay the bill for the unnecessary or nonbeneficial service.35 
After these actors are briefly introduced, the disjointed promise and 
reality of informed consent is summarized. 
A.   The Ongoing Story: Overtreatment 
Long free of any meaningful legal regulation and, perhaps, spurred 
by reimbursement policy itself, overtreatment—defined as the provi-
sion of unnecessary, comparatively too expensive, or nonbeneficial 
care—is a uniquely American problem.36 Recent attempts at regulat-
ing overtreatment through the anti-fraud statutes—and at widening 
the FCA generally—has brought critique,37 but without any other 
means by which to regulate overtreatment in American health care, 
there may not be a perfectly satisfactory solution.38 
Overtreatment remains a major driver of excess cost in American 
health care. The causes are easy to peg: financial incentives, demand-
ing patients, technological advances and, to a lesser extent, physicians’ 
fear of legal liability.39 Overtreatment contributes to the problem of the 
United States spending nearly 18% of its GDP on health care,40 out-
pacing every other industrialized nation on earth by a substantial 
                                                                                                                  
 35. See Nicole Cafarella Lallemand, Reducing Waste in Health Care, HEALTH AFF. 
(Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=82 
(noting that overtreatment “includes care that is rooted in outmoded habits, . . . is driven 
by providers’ preferences rather than those of informed patients, . . . ignores scientific 
findings, . . . [and] is motivated by something other than provision of optimal care for a 
patient”); see also Eric Heisig, Lawsuit Accuses Cleveland Clinic of Performing Unnecessary 
Tests on Patients to Reap Medicare Benefits, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 22, 2015, 2:04 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2015/01/lawsuit_accuses_cleveland_clin.html 
(describing lawsuit accusing the Cleveland Clinic of performing unnecessary medical tests 
in order to obtain more Medicare payouts); Two Companies to Pay $3.75 Million for  
Allegedly Causing Submission of Claims for Unreasonable or Unnecessary  
Rehabilitation Therapy at Skilled Nursing Facilities, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Sept. 5, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-companies-pay-375-million-allegedly-causing- 
submission-claims-unreasonable-or-unnecessary (documenting government allegations 
that the settling party provided “unreasonable or unnecessary therapy to patients in order 
to increase Medicare reimbursement to the facilities”). 
 36. See Why Is Health Spending in the United States So High?, OECD 1, 1 
http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/49084355.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2016) (noting that 
American health spending per person per capita totaled $7960 in 2009, while the second-
highest country, Norway, was at $5352, and the United Kingdom was at $3487). Unneces-
sary surgeries have been described as belonging to one of three categories: immoral, incom-
petent, or indifferent. Eisler & Hansen, supra note 13. 
 37. See John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, Why Thompson Is Wrong: Misuse of the False 
Claims Act to Enforce the Anti-Kickback Act, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1999) (arguing against the 
widening application of the FCA); Buck, Caring Too Much, supra note 23, at 468-69 (noting 
the potential practical problems in applying the FCA to cases of overtreatment). 
 38. See Buck, supra note 24, at 1266-67.  
 39. See Buck, Caring Too Much, supra note 23, at 473. 
 40. See Health Expenditure, Total (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). See gen-
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margin.41 According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, American providers use a lot of expensive machin-
ery and administer a lot of elective surgery.42 They also use screening 
equipment more than any other country.43 Every year seemingly  
common procedures are either deemed overused or nonbeneficial: 
questionable stent placements caught the attention of the media in 
200644 and, later, federal prosecutors;45 rapid increases in the use of 
computed tomography (“CT”) scans in the nation’s emergency rooms 
raised eyebrows in 2011;46 overuse of various “advanced . . . cancer 
treatments” grabbed headlines in 2013;47 and “Choosing Wisely,” a 
campaign launched by the American Board of Internal Medicine Foun-
dation and Consumer Reports magazine, noted the unnecessary nature 
of requiring pelvic exams for women seeking contraception in 2013.48  
Two characteristics of America’s overtreatment challenge are par-
ticularly striking. First, as has been noted before, “[m]uch of the waste 
in [America’s] health care system stems from costly procedures with 
                                                                                                                  
erally Sabriya Rice, Reform Update: Doctors Order Unnecessary Tests Without Even Realiz-
ing It, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/ 
article/20140915/NEWS/309159965 (noting that “[n]early a third of the orders that the sur-
veyed physicians [in the study] placed were defensive on some level.”); Michael B. Rothberg 
et al., The Cost of Defensive Medicine on 3 Hospital Medicine Services, JAMA INTERNAL MED. 
(Nov. 2014), http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1904758 (study noting 
that “a large portion of hospital orders had some defensive component” but that “few orders 
were completely defensive and that physicians’ attitudes about defensive medicine did not 
correlate with cost”). 
 41. See Why is Health Spending in the United States so High?, supra note 36. 
 42. See id. at 5. 
 43. OECD, HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2013: OECD INDICATORS 125 tbl.5.9.1 (2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Health-at-a-Glance-2013.pdf. The United States 
ranks first in the amount of women aged 20–69 who underwent a cervical cancer screening, 
id., but eighteenth out of twenty-two for cervical cancer five-year relative survival, id. at 
tbl.5.9.2. The United States was third in the amount of mammography screening, id. at 
tbl.5.10.1, and first in breast cancer five-year relative survival, id. at tbl.5.10.2.  
 44. See Reed Abelson, Heart Procedure Is off the Charts in an Ohio City, N.Y. TIMES  
(Aug. 18, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/business/18stent.html?pagewanted=all& 
_r=0. 
 45. See U.S. Attorney’s Office Collected Nearly $24 Million in FY 2013, DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 
10, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao/ohn/news/2014/10jancollect.html (noting settlements 
paid by health care providers for allegations that they performed unnecessary cardiac pro-
cedures on Medicare patients). 
 46. See Phil Galewitz, ER Use of CT Scans Rises Sharply, Raising Questions About 
Costs and Benefits, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 10, 2011), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/ 
news/er-use-of-ct-scans-rises-sharply-raising-questions-about-costs-and-benefits/. 
 47. See, e.g., Dennis Thompson, New, Pricey Prostate Cancer Treatments May Be  
Overused: Study, HEALTHDAY (June 25, 2013), http://consumer.healthday.com/cancer- 
information-5/mis-cancer-news-102/pricey-prostate-cancer-treatments-may-be-overused-
study-677713.html. 
 48. See Susan Perry, Unnecessary or Overused Medical Tests, Treatments: New ‘Choos-
ing Wisely’ Lists, MINNPOST (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.minnpost.com/second-opin-
ion/2013/09/unnecessary-or-overused-medical-tests-treatments-new-choosing- 
wisely-lists. 
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either weak supporting evidence, high-risk complications or other sig-
nificant tradeoffs.”49 That is, most of the cause of America’s overtreat-
ment crisis can be blamed on procedures that are of questionable clin-
ical defensibility. As a result, a belief that a more robust notion of in-
formed consent would curtail the number of these procedures offered 
to American patients makes intuitive sense. 
Second, overtreatment presents problems beyond the financial. In 
fact, overtreatment can lead to serious medical complications, adverse 
psychological effects on patients, and—particularly for overused test-
ing equipment “progressively invasive and expensive diagnostic tests 
required to disprove a false positive result.”50 Where an unnecessary 
medical test indicates a potential false positive for a health condition, 
“[s]ometimes the test leads you down a path, a therapeutic cascade, 
where you start to tumble downstream to more and more testing, and 
more and more invasive testing, and possibly even treatment for 
things that should be left well enough alone.”51 
As has been mentioned before, more health care does not result in 
better health.52 In a 2014 Commonwealth Fund survey, the United 
States health care system was once again rated as the most expensive 
in the world,53 but the report concluded that America “underperforms 
relative to other countries on most dimensions of performance.”54 In 
the results, the United States ranked last of the eleven countries sur-
veyed,55 as it did in previous surveys in 2010, 2007, 2006, and 2004.56 
And America’s life expectancy—albeit not a perfect arbiter of a coun-
try’s health—is 78.7 years, good enough for twenty-sixth out of forty 
OECD countries.57 Even after the passage of the ACA, more stunning 
                                                                                                                  
 49. Moulton & King, supra note 22, at 93. 
 50. See Krause, supra note 27, at 280. 
 51. Parker-Pope, supra note 14 (quoting Shannon Brownlee, acting director of the 
health policy program at the New America Foundation). 
 52. See Olga Khazan, U.S. Healthcare: Most Expensive and Worst Performing, ATLANTIC 
(June 16, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/us-healthcare-most-ex-
pensive-and-worst-performing/372828/ (noting that “when it comes to healthcare, Americans 
get neither quality nor affordability”). 
 53. KAREN DAVIS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FOUND., 2014 UPDATE: MIRROR, 
MIRROR ON THE WALL: HOW THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM COMPARES INTERNATIONALLY 
7 Exhibit ES-1 (2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund- 
reports/2014/jun/mirror-mirror. 
 54. Id. 
 55. These countries are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See id. at 
Exhibit ES-1. 
 56. Id. at 7. 
 57.  OECD, supra note 43, at 25 tbl.1.1.1.  
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is America’s failure to provide insurance for all of its citizens.58 A frac-
tured and bloated system results; a chart comparing life expectancy at 
birth with health spending per capita puts the United States in a plane 
by itself.59 
But the view is not necessarily universal. Recent surveys have 
shown that health care providers do not deny that the United States 
has an overtreatment problem. In a survey sponsored by the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation, 73% of surveyed physicians called the “fre-
quency of unnecessary tests and procedures” in American health care 
either a “very . . . or somewhat . . . serious problem.”60 Starkly, when 
asked what the physician would do when a patient came to you con-
vinced he or she needed a specific test that was unnecessary but the 
patient was quite insistent, 53% of respondents answered that they 
would either order the test or order it but advise against it.61 That 
number grew to 61% of responding physicians who saw more than  
100 patients each week.62 Further, only 41% of responding physicians   
                                                                                                                  
 58. According to Gallup, as of the fourth quarter of 2014, the number of Americans who 
remained uninsured was 12.9%. Jenna Levy, In U.S., Uninsured Rate Sinks to 12.9%, 
GALLUP (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/180425/uninsured-rate-sinks.aspx (show-
ing that, granted, this number was substantially lower than the uninsured rate of 17.1%, 
measured in the fourth quarter of 2013). As of March of 2016, nineteen states were still 
firmly refusing to expand their Medicaid programs. See Status of State Action on the  
Medicaid Expansion Decision, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/ 
state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/ 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2016).  
 59. OECD, supra note 43, at 25 tbl.1.1.3.  
 60. See PERRYUNDEM RESEARCH/COMMC’N, ABIM FOUND., UNNECESSARY TESTS AND 
PROCEDURES IN THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: WHAT PHYSICIANS SAY ABOUT THE PROBLEM, 
THE CAUSES, AND THE SOLUTIONS 3 (2014), https://kaiserhealthnews.files.wordpress.com/ 
2014/05/042814_final-choosing-wisely-survey-report.pdf. 
 61. Id. at 4. 
 62. Id. at 5. 
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noted that they always, almost always, or often talk to their patients 
about the costs of a procedure; 44% answered that they do not discuss 
costs too often, rarely, or never do so.63  
Nevertheless, physicians think they are in the best position to pre-
vent unnecessary care,64 but “empirical research demonstrates that 
physicians are highly inaccurate at predicting the goals and prefer-
ences of their patients.”65 Surveys conclude by summarizing that 
“[p]hysicians clearly recognize the problem of unnecessary tests and 
procedures in the health care system” and “are not placing the problem 
or blame on patients.”66 According to physicians themselves, the causes 
of the overtreatment problem are “malpractice concerns and the phy-
sician’s [sic] own desire to reassure themselves.”67 Only 5% of physi-
cian respondents said “they are influenced by the presence of new tech-
nology in their offices,”68 and similarly, 5% answered that the fee-for-
service (“FFS”) reimbursement system was a cause of overtreatment.69 
Of course, whether or not physicians themselves believe they are the 
cause of the overtreatment crisis—and what, exactly, the causes of 
the crisis are—are not completely relevant to the analysis; indeed, 
physicians remain a vital actor within a system consumed by over-
treatment. 
B.   The Decision-Makers in American Health Care 
Payers. One way to clamp down on the provision of unnecessary and 
nonbeneficial services is to entrust the third party in the health care 
chain—the payer—to impose strict reimbursement standards. It 
makes sense that the payer would have an incentive to limit unneces-
sary care; after all, a private payer’s financial incentives push it to cut 
                                                                                                                  
 63. Id. at 7. 
 64. Tellingly, 15% of respondents answered that the government “is in the best position 
to help address the problem of unnecessary tests and procedures,” 7% of respondents an-
swered that trial lawyers would be in the best position, and 0% answered that Medicare 
would be in the best position. Id. at 8.  
 65. Moulton & King, supra note 22, at 86. 
 66. PERRYUNDEM RESEARCH/COMMC’N, supra note 60, at 13. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Jordan Rau, Doctors Think Others Often Prescribe Unnecessary Care, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (May 1, 2014), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/doctors-think-others-often-
prescribe-unnecessary-care/. 
 69. Id. 
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costs where it can. A payer that denies coverage for unnecessary ser-
vices is a payer that is making money70—at least it was in the pre-ACA 
world.71 
This was the suggested solution to the health care cost crisis in the 
1990s;72 third-party health maintenance organizations (“HMOs”) were 
empowered to deny care to Americans with private insurance, and in 
order to keep costs low, HMOs employed tactics that were intended to 
limit care.73 While this practice worked to bend and slow the exponen-
tial growth of the cost of American health care,74 patients—cognizant 
                                                                                                                  
 70. See Sharona Hoffman, A Proposal for Federal Legislation to Address Health Insur-
ance Coverage for Experimental and Investigational Treatments, 78 OR. L. REV. 203, 209-10 
(1999) (noting that the administrator has incentives to “enhance the insurer’s profits by de-
clining to pay the claims of policyholders and thus might be tempted to construe coverage 
provisions very narrowly to deny claims as often as possible”); Jessica L. Roberts, Health 
Law as Disability Rights Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1963, 1970 (2013) (noting that coverage was 
denied to “one in seven applicants” based on a preexisting condition); Arthur Nussbaum, 
Comment, Can Congress Make You Buy Health Insurance? The Affordable Care Act, National 
Health Care Reform, and the Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 
411, 442-43 (2012) (“[I]nsurance companies either deny coverage, charge increased premi-
ums based on past and current medical history, exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions, 
or limit the amounts of coverage afforded.”). 
 71. The ACA outlaws discrimination, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-148, § 2704, 124 Stat. 119, 154 (2010), and prevents lifelong or annual caps in 
health care.  § 2711, 124 Stat. at 131; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 
102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1383 (2014) (noting that the ACA “forbids insurance companies 
from denying people coverage because of preexisting conditions and also disallows lifetime 
limits on coverage”); Sarah McDaniel, The Costs of Early-Onset Alzheimer’s Disease and the 
Federal Benefits Dilemma, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 133, 162 (2010) (noting that the ACA “elimi-
nates the ability of private insurance companies to deny coverage to people because of an 
[early-onset Alzheimer’s Disease] diagnosis”). The ACA also limits the amount of profit 
health insurance companies can bank; at least 85% of premiums collected must go toward 
spending money on beneficiaries’ health care and quality improvement. Explaining Health 
Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 29, 2012), 
http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/explaining-health-care-reform-medical-loss-ratio-
mlr/. 
 72. Before the ACA attempted to address some of the cases of the “health care cost cri-
sis,” it had been an ongoing, unaddressed threat spanning at least thirty years. In 1976, 
President Jimmy Carter famously remarked, “We’ve built a haphazard, unsound, undi-
rected, inefficient non-system, which has left us unhealthy and unwealthy at the same time. 
So we must plan and decisively phase in, simultaneous reform of services and refinancing of 
cost.” David Levering, Unite for Health Reform, HIGHBEAM RES. (July 22, 2009), 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-20564571.html; Interview by Bill Moyers with Dr. Sid-
ney Wolfe, President, Public Citizen & Dr. David Himmelstein, Harvard Medical School 
(May 22, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/05222009/watch2.html. 
 73. See Christopher G. Gegwich, Note, Medicare Managed Care: A New Constitutional 
Right to Due Process for Denials of Care Under Grijalva v. Shalala, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 185, 
188 (1999) (presenting the cost-containment efforts of HMOs, including the ability to “nego-
tiate lower fees than traditional insurance,” the limitation of patient access to both physi-
cians and procedures, limiting choice, and the addition of the primary care physician “gate-
keeper” meant to “coordinate treatment and determine its medical necessity”). 
 74. See Michael S. Jacobs, When Antitrust Fails: Public Health, Public Hospitals, and 
Public Values, 71 WASH. L. REV. 899, 910 (1996) (“HMOs have been successful in wresting 
price reductions from competing local hospitals . . . .”); Frank J. Vandall, An Examination of 
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of the fact that their care was being limited and that their providers’ 
expertise was too often being “trumped” by third-party technocrats be-
ing paid to deny them care—recoiled.75 By the late 1990s, the American 
public had had enough; the HMO as the viable cost containment solu-
tion was largely abandoned.76 
Medicare could have been a major player in cost containment for 
American health care but was never structured in a way to limit cost.77 
Attempts at limiting cost have been blocked; Medicare’s most powerful 
cost containment strategy—specifically the sustainable growth rate—
has been overridden by Congress nearly annually.78 Further, medical 
necessity determinations within Medicare can be subject to erroneous 
conclusions.79 Finally, beyond the procedural concerns of establishing 
Medicare as the primary decision-maker in American health care, 
Medicare is not the expert party for clinical practice; installing the 
                                                                                                                  
the Duty Issue in Health Care Litigation: Should HMOs Be Liable in Tort for “Medical Ne-
cessity” Decisions?, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 293, 294 (1998) (“The HMO concept has been successful 
in halting the medical-cost explosion and in making health care widely available at afforda-
ble rates.”); Matthew Yglesias, The Health Care Cost Curve Is Bending, SLATE (Aug. 2, 2013, 
4:20 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/08/02/the_health_care_cost_curve_is_ 
bending.html (noting that the cost curve was bent “in the late-1990s . . . when HMOs were 
containing health care spending”). 
 75. See Charles Bierbauer, Doctors and Managed Care – Are HMOs Good Medicine?, 
CNN (July 15, 1998, 8:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9807/15/hmo.docs.prognosis/ 
(stating that “some doctors can barely control their anger” toward HMOs and noting, poign-
antly, that some doctors would like to see “ ‘a better balance between the physician-patient 
relationship dictating what the service should be, as opposed to the HMO dictating what the 
service should be’ ” (quoting Dr. Bruce Rushbaum)). By 1998, 85% of the American work 
force was enrolled in a managed care plan, up from 50% just four years earlier. Peter T. 
Kilborn, Voters’ Anger at H.M.O.’s Plays as Hot Political Issue, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/17/us/voters-anger-at-hmo-s-plays-as-hot-political-is-
sue.html. 
 76. See Kilborn, supra note 75.  
 77. See Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked, 
101 GEO. L.J. 519, 521 (2013); Buck, supra note 24, at 1268, 1270-73, 1275, 1277. 
 78. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 790 (7th 
ed. 2013) (“CMS upped the ante, adopting the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) formula which 
imposes cumulative forced reductions in physician payments when total physician spending 
exceeds a fixed spending. That is, if the total spending on physician services in a given year 
exceeds an aggregate target based on the GDP and other factors, the formula requires re-
couping that excess spending by reducing fee levels the next year. . . . Each year since 2001 
except one, Congress has passed legislation that overrode fee reductions.”) (citation omitted). 
 79. See Buck, supra note 24, at 1273. 
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payer as the decision-maker—or even giving it the appearance of deci-
sion-making capacity—is an unpopular supposition for American pa-
tients.80 
Providers. Providers, the first actors in the chain, are a chief target 
of modern cost containment efforts within the ACA.81 After decades of 
failing to align provider incentives with those of Medicare due largely 
to structural weaknesses in the program,82 grants for the creation of 
ACOs—like the one seen in McAllen—and stepped-up efforts to bundle 
payments to providers and hospitals83 within the ACA are examples of 
tools that seek to incentivize providers to provide more cost-effective 
care—perhaps signaling the “death” of fee-for-service reimburse-
ment.84 Studies show that ACOs may save the system a substantial 
amount of money.85 
Outside of these modern reforms, the current structure—which still 
rewards overuse and overtreatment—has an impact on the total 
amount and expense of administered clinical care.86 Specifically as to 
                                                                                                                  
 80. See Jon Greenberg, Health Law Puts Government in Between Patient and Doctors, 
Mitt Romney Says, POLITIFACT (July 9, 2012, 10:58 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2012/jul/09/mitt-romney/health-law-puts-government-between-patients-
and-do/ (noting that presidential candidate Mitt Romney claimed that “Obamacare puts the 
federal government between you and your doctor” but concluding that the statement was 
“false”).  
 81. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2706, 
124 Stat. 119, 325 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a note (2012)) (establishing the Pedi-
atric Accountable Care Organization Demonstration Project). 
 82. See Bagley, supra note 77, at 541-44; Buck, supra note 24, at 1271-75, 1277. 
 83. See Jayne O’Donnell, Feds Step up Changes to Hospital Payments, USA TODAY  
(Jan. 26, 2015, 6:07 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/01/26/medicare- 
alternative-payments-hhs/22347975/?elq_cid=1306202 (noting that Health and Human Ser-
vices “hopes to tie 30% of traditional Medicare payments to quality or value  
through . . . ‘alternative payment models’ by the end of 2016, up from 20%”); Louise Radnof-
sky & Melinda Beck, Medicare to Rework Billions in Payments, WALL ST. J., 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/medicare-to-rework-billions-in-payments-1422293419?elq_ 
cid=1306202 (last updated Jan. 26, 2015, 1:14 PM) (noting that Health and Human Services 
Secretary Sylvia Burwell wants to move to a quality-based payment method). 
 84. See Robert Pear, Health Care Enrollment Appears to Be Near Goal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/us/politics/health-care-enrollment-appears-
to-be-near-goal.html?_r=0 (nothing that 20% of reimbursement within Medicare was “linked 
to doctors’ abilities to coordinate care” [($72.4 billion of $362 billion)] and that Sylvia Burwell 
wanted the proportion to rise to “50 percent by the end of 2018”). 
 85. See New Affordable Care Act Tools and Payment Models Deliver $372 Million in 
Savings, Improve Care, (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/09/ 
20140916a.html (noting that the Pioneer ACO Model and Medicare Shared Savings Program 
ACO generated over $372 million); see also Henry Davis, New Accountable Care  
Organizations Save Medicare $372 Million, BUFFALO NEWS (Sept. 23, 2014, 9:08 PM), 
http://www.buffalonews.com/city-region/new-accountable-care-organizations-save- 
medicare-372-million-20140923 (noting Buffalo’s ACO saved nearly $28 million in 2013). 
 86. See Julie Barnes, Moving Away From Fee-for-Service, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/moving-away-from-fee-for-service/ 
256755/ (“In a FFS model, payers reimburse for all services, regardless of their impact on 
patient health. Little or no countervailing pressure to discourage the delivery of unnecessary 
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Medicare patients, the DOJ has reviewed medical decisions while re-
lying on its anti-fraud tools, as have other third-party payers.87 Where 
evidence of waste is clear, the DOJ has relied on the allegation that 
care was either not “medically necessary” or not part of Medicare’s Na-
tional Coverage Determination (“NCD”) to target providers who pro-
vide too much health care.88 For various reasons, the government’s us-
age of Medicare’s practice standards or prosecutors’ conceptions of 
medical necessity leaves the enforcement regime subject to criticism 
on a number of fronts.89 
Patients. A number of pressures act on the patient—the most in-
tense of which may be the pressure of pain and anxiety.90 However, 
aside from these inherent challenges, relying on patients to be a viable 
solution to the problem of overtreatment has not been fully explored. 
The ACA has increased cost-sharing within its provisions, and other 
scholars have suggested proposals for making patients more aware of 
and pressured by the cost of health care,91 but linking the solution to 
overtreatment with the patient’s desires by using the anti-fraud stat-
utes has not yet been proposed. 
The patient’s chief legal protection is the doctrine of informed con-
sent—patients have the exclusive right to decline treatment, and must 
positively consent to it, before the provider can administer care—even 
for life-sustaining treatment.92 Beyond satisfying the bioethical tenet 
of autonomy and the law’s concern with bodily integrity, it may simply 
be the case that patients just make better decisions as they are free 
from notable pressures.93 Presumably, the insured patient is the only   
                                                                                                                  
services exists in this system.”); Eisler & Hansen, supra note 13 (“The fee-for-service nature 
of U.S. health care, where the hospitals and doctors get more money for every operation they 
perform, essentially rewards those that put more patients under the knife.”). 
 87. See Moulton & King, supra note 22, at 93 (noting that “both private and public in-
surers have begun to review physician recommendations for necessity and reasonableness 
in making coverage determinations” but that during these reviews, “insurers have generally 
made coverage decisions based on physicians’ opinions regarding clinical benefit, without 
consideration of the individual patient’s preferences”). 
 88. See Buck, Caring Too Much, supra note 23, at 492. 
 89. See id. at 469; Buck, Enforcement Overdose, supra note 23, at 292-309. 
 90. See Krause, supra note 27, at 273 (“Patients commonly seek medical attention when 
they are ill or injured, when their ability to understand and participate in care may be hin-
dered by anxiety about their physical well-being or by the physical effects of their medical 
problems.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Christopher Robertson, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to Put Skin 
Back in the Health Care Game, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 930-31 (2013). 
 92. See Pope, supra note 33, at 260 (presenting a list of potential legal remedies and 
penalties available for treating individuals—even with life-sustaining measures—without 
consent). 
 93. This assumption is limited to patients who are enrolled in the Medicare program 
and do not have substantial cost sharing or deductible requirements. 
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actor in the system that is sufficiently free from any perverse financial 
incentives one way or the other—both free of incentives to increase the 
amount and expense of care (providers), and decrease the amount of 
care administered (payers).94   
Further, establishing an enforcement framework that respects pa-
tients’ wishes as paramount erects a second hurdle for the provision of 
unnecessary or nonbeneficial care: for cases in which informed consent 
is needed, the care must have already been determined to be medically 
necessary by the treating physician, or else it is fraudulent.95 Placing 
the patient’s clinical decision at the center of a fraud-based enforce-
ment framework would take advantage of the fact that the provider 
had already determined the potential procedure to be medically neces-
sary because, theoretically at least, patients cannot consent to unnec-
essary care. 
III.   INFORMED CONSENT 
Legal scholars have argued the attributes and deficiencies of in-
formed consent at great length; this paper will not delve too deeply 
into those arguments. On a practical level, one would think the protec-
tion of informed consent could serve as an important tool in American 
health care that could be used to limit the amount of unnecessary or 
nonbeneficial care that providers administer.96 After all, the ultimate 
clinical decision rests with the patient, and unnecessary treatment—
given its deleterious financial and potential health effects on individ-
uals97—should rarely be desired by the patients themselves. 
But the analysis is more complicated than that. The patient’s ca-
pacity to make an informed judgment is clouded by a number of fac-
tors—namely, the patient may be inappropriately influenced, one way 
or another, by cost pressures; may be desperately seeking resolution 
                                                                                                                  
 94. Moral hazard may act on the patient to request health care that they do not actually 
need, just because they have health insurance that will foot the bill. But no financial incen-
tive—that is, the patient does not make more money—exists that works on them to either 
increase or decrease the amount of health care they use. 
 95. See discussion and accompanying notes infra Section V.A.4. 
 96. David Wennberg has recommended “a paradigm shift from informed patient con-
sent to informed patient choice.” INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE HEALTHCARE 
IMPERATIVE: LOWERING COSTS AND IMPROVING OUTCOMES 18 (Pierre L. Yong et al. eds., 
2010). This inculcates the tenets of shared decision-making in order to ensure active partic-
ipation of the patient, which ultimately empowers the patient. See generally HEALTH 
DIALOG, SHARED DECISION MAKING (2015), http://www.healthdialog.com/sites/default/files/ 
resources/Shared%20Decision%20Making.pdf. 
 97. See Linda C. Fentiman, Patient Advocacy and Termination from Managed Care Or-
ganizations. Do State Laws Protecting Health Care Professional Advocacy Make Any Differ-
ence?, 82 NEB. L. REV. 508, 522 (2003) (noting that unnecessary care “can be merely unhelp-
ful or actively harmful”); Victor R. Fuchs, Commentary, No Pain, No Gain: Perspectives on 
Cost Containment, 269 JAMA 631, 631 (1993) (defining unnecessary care as “care that on 
balance does patients more harm than good”).  
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to a frightening health concern or problem; and may not understand 
all the clinical complexities of the alternative treatments they have 
been offered.98 In short, the protection of informed consent may not be 
a perfect fit for patients, especially when the allegation of a lack of 
informed consent is based upon a failure to disclose treatment alter-
natives.99 This is particularly the case when it comes to the require-
ment that the patient demonstrate compensable harm.100  
Nevertheless, informed consent has been called “the hallmark of 
the modern era in medical ethics,”101 occupying a position of primacy 
within the field of bioethics,102 but has also been called “little more than 
a legally worthless piece of paper with signatures obtained and filed 
away in the medical record.”103 It has been noted for being “weak”104 as 
well as “vital to the ethics of imposing risk on patients.”105 It has been 
called “the bedrock of contemporary health law”106 but is nearly uni-
versally criticized for its unworkability and inapplicability to the time 
                                                                                                                  
 98. Cf. Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients? Problems with 
Theory and Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 485, 495 (2004) (list-
ing patient characteristics as compared to general consumers). 
 99. See Krause, supra note 27, at 308-22 (calling the doctrine’s “[v]estiges of [b]attery,” 
variant disclosure standards, causation standard, and the compensable harm requirement 
“problematic”). 
 100. Id. at 321 (noting that “[i]n a case involving the nondisclosure of treatment alterna-
tives . . . the ‘harm’ may be far less tangible. To the extent that the physician fails to inform 
the patient of a therapy that has fewer risks or a better outcome than the proposed treat-
ment, the patient should be able to proceed under the traditional theory. But what if the 
nondisclosed therapy was more risky than the proposed therapy, yet had a lower risk of 
certain side effects that were particularly important to that patient?”).  
 101. Alan Meisel & Mark Kuczewski, Legal and Ethical Myths About Informed Consent, 
156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2521, 2521 (1996). 
 102. See Informed Consent, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 20, 2011), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/informed-consent/ (noting that “[f]ew principles are as often 
identified with bioethics as informed consent”). 
 103. Marshall B. Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care: 
Informed Consent and Informed Choice, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 91, 99 (2007) (footnote omitted). 
 104. DAN J. TENNENHOUSE, 1 ATTORNEYS MEDICAL DESKBOOK § 10:41, Westlaw (data-
base updated Oct. 2015) (“As a result, even though it is a very common secondary theory of 
liability in medical negligence cases, informed consent itself is usually a weak theory unless 
the risk is of an extremely sensitive nature such as loss of childbearing or sexual capacity, 
cosmetic deformity or severe neurologic impairment.”). 
 105. Stephen R. Munzer, How to Integrate Administrative Law and Tort Law: The Reg-
ulation of Stem Cell Products, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 743, 778 (2012); see Abilash A. Gopal et al., 
Dynamic Informed Consent Processes Vital for Treatment with Antidepressants, 35 INT’L J.L. 
& PSYCHIATRY 392 (2012) (proposing a “dynamic concept of informed consent”); see also Edi-
torial, Informed Consent Vital in Epilepsy Treatment, GAINESVILLE.COM, (Mar. 23, 2008, 6:01 
AM), http://www.gainesville.com/article/20080323/OPINION01/803220328?Title=Editorial-
Informed-consent-vital-in-epilepsy-treatment. 
 106. Wendy E. Parmet, Unprepared: Why Health Law Fails to Prepare Us for a Pan-
demic, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 157, 173 (2006). 
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pressures that characterize modern medicine.107 Notwithstanding the 
withering critique, the American Medical Association (“AMA”) notes 
that the doctrine “is a basic policy in both ethics and law that physi-
cians must honor, unless the patient is unconscious or otherwise inca-
pable of consenting and harm from failure to treat is imminent.”108  
In order to achieve adequate informed consent, the provider is re-
quired to share with the patient relevant clinical information.109 
Through the development of case law, courts have imposed a number 
of disclosure requirements on physicians110—including the relevant 
health condition, proposed treatment, possible alternatives,111 risks,112 
individual or financial interests,113 and perhaps even the physician’s 
own experience.114 The specific standards are governed by state law—
and are heterogeneous.115 Nonetheless, “every state imposes statutory 
                                                                                                                  
 107. See Kapp, supra note 103, at 101 (citing Steven H. Woolf et al., Promoting Informed 
Choice: Transforming Health Care to Dispense Knowledge for Decision Making, 143 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 293, 294 (2005)). 
 108. Opinion 8.08 - Informed Consent, AMA, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/ 
physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion808.page? (last updated Nov. 
2006). 
 109. See George J. Annas, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 116 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that the 
physician is required to disclose “(1) A description of the recommended treatment or proce-
dure; (2) [a] description of the risks and benefits of the recommended procedure, with special 
emphasis on risks of death or serious bodily disability; (3) [a] description of the alternatives, 
including other treatments or procedures, together with the risks and benefits of these al-
ternatives; (4) [t]he likely results of no treatment; (5) [t]he probability of success, and what 
the physician means by success; (6) [t]he major problems anticipated in recuperation, and 
the time period during which the patient will not be able to resume his or her normal activ-
ities; and (7) [a]ny other information generally provided to patients in this situation by other 
qualified physicians.”). 
 110. See id. at 117.  
 111. See, e.g., Jandre v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 792 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2010) (requiring the provider to disclose ultrasound test as a possible option). 
 112. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting that 
the physician is required to “warn of the dangers lurking in the proposed treatment” and 
what is in the patient’s best interest and that that a physician has a “duty of reasonable 
disclosure of the choices with respect to proposed therapy and the dangers inherently and 
potentially involved”); Barcai v. Betwee, 50 P.3d 946, 959-63 (Haw. 2002) (discussing the 
requirement that the physician disclose any risks involved); Gates v. Jenson, 595 P.2d 
919, 922-23 (Wash. 1979) (requiring disclosure of abnormality); see also Bryan Murray, 
Informed Consent: What Must a Physician Disclose to a Patient?, 14 AMA J. ETHICS 563 
(2012), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2012/07/hlaw1-1207.html (discussing legal 
standards and defining the types of risks that physicians must disclose). 
 113. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (finding 
that a physician has a duty to disclose a financial interest). 
 114. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996) (requiring that the phy-
sician disclose his surgical experience). 
 115. See Marshall B. Kapp, A Legal Approach to the Use of Human Biological Materials 
for Research Purposes, 10 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 23 (2013) (“The particular details of 
informed consent vary according to individual state laws.”); see also Suzanne Sangree, Con-
trol of Childbearing by HIV-Positive Women: Some Responses to Emerging Legal Policies, 41 
BUFF. L. REV. 309, 366 (1993) (noting that “[v]arying levels of specificity of consent are re-
quired depending upon the type of procedure involved”). 
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requirements that health care professionals obtain patients’ informed 
consent before proceeding with any type of medical treatment.”116 The 
key requirement under the doctrine is that the patient has “all infor-
mation necessary to make a knowledgeable choice” for his or her 
health.117 After the provider or practice guidelines have determined 
that the procedure is necessary—or at least arguably medically neces-
sary—the decision then moves into the patient’s hands.  
A.   A Lack of Information 
Nevertheless, just because patients have the right to informed con-
sent doesn’t mean they will choose what is best. For sure, patients sub-
ject to overtreatment—or clearly non-beneficial care—may be patients 
who steadfastly cling to the belief that more care118 or more expensive 
care119 is better care, or may be patients who are so preoccupied with 
their emergent condition that they cede all decision-making power to   
                                                                                                                  
 116. Danielle C. Le Jeune, Note, An “Exception”-ally Difficult Situation: Do the Excep-
tions, or Lack Thereof, to the “Speech-and-Display Requirements” for Abortion Invalidate 
Their Use As Informed Consent?, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 521, 523-24 (2014) (emphasis  
added). 
 117. Id. at 527. 
 118. See Tammy C. Hoffman & Chris Del Mar, Patients’ Expectations of the Benefits and 
Harms of Treatments, Screening, and Tests: A Systematic Review, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 
274, 274 (2015), http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=2038981 (noting a 
recent study that examined participants in studies and concluding that a “majority of par-
ticipants overestimated intervention benefit and underestimated harm”). But see Keerthi 
Gogineni et al., Patient Demands and Requests for Cancer Tests and Treatments, 1 JAMA 
ONCOLOGY 33, 33 (2015), http://oncology.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=2108852 
(noting that the vast majority of patients who request a particular procedure request “clini-
cally appropriate” care); Howard Gleckman, The Myth of the Demanding Patient, FORBES 
(Feb. 25, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/2015/02/25/the-
myth-of-the-demanding-patient/ (“Ask a physician why he prescribes unnecessary tests or 
treatments, and he’s likely to say he’s responding to demands from his patients (or trying to 
avoid a lawsuit). But a new study in the journal JAMA Oncology finds that perception may 
be wildly wrong.”); Shefali Luthra, Study: Physicians Report Few Requests by Patients for ‘Un-
necessary’ Treatments, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 12, 2015), http://kaiserhealth-
news.org/news/study-physicians-report-few-requests-by-patients-for-unnecessary-treatments/ 
(noting that “patient demands are likely not the impetus for unnecessary procedures”). 
 119. See Chapin White et al., Understanding Differences Between High- and Low-Price 
Hospitals: Implications for Efforts to Rein in Costs, 33 HEALTH AFF. 324, 324 (2014), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/33/2/324.full.pdf+html (“High-price hospitals fared 
much better than low-price hospitals did in U.S. News & World Report rankings, which are 
largely based on reputation, while generally scoring worse on objective measures of quality, 
such as postsurgical mortality rates. Thus, insurers may face resistance if they attempt to 
steer patients away from high-price hospitals because these facilities have good reputations 
and offer specialized services that may be unique in their markets.”); Sarah Kliff, Half of 
Americans Think Expensive Medical Care is Better. They’re Wrong., VOX (July 21, 2014, 12:30 
PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/7/21/5922835/half-of-americans-think-expensive-medical-care-
is-better-theyre-wrong (noting that a recent poll found 48% of Americans believed higher qual-
ity care costs more to deliver).  
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the provider involved. But data demonstrates that these patients are 
rare.120 Nevertheless, for the patient involved in an emergency condi-
tion, the protections of informed consent are weak, at best.121 
This analysis assumes that the majority of patients, when pre-
sented with complete information, would make better clinical deci-
sions. For these purposes, the prototypical patient lacks information 
that would be helpful in understanding that the proposed procedure is 
likely to be nonbeneficial.122 Perhaps the patient simply does not know 
that this particular procedure is unlikely to confer any clinical benefit 
or is operating under the mistaken belief—a mistake that could be 
                                                                                                                  
 120. See Jamie Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The 
Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 468-69 (2006). 
 121. In a striking piece for Time magazine in January 2015, journalist Steven Brill—a 
leading commenter on, and critic of, America’s health care system—describes his experience 
with open-heart surgery during the previous year. Steven Brill, What I Learned From My 
$190,000 Open-Heart Surgery, TIME, Jan. 19, 2015, at 34, 38. Clearly illustrative of the pa-
tient for whom the protection of informed consent does not match the clinical reality, Brill’s 
article personalizes the challenges facing the effort to control cost in American health care. 
Id. In it, he notes:  
 Fear of illness. Or pain. Or death. And wanting to do some-
thing, anything, to avoid that for yourself or a loved one.  
 . . . . 
 There were occasions during those eight days in the hospital 
when the non-drug-addled part of my brain wondered, when nurses came 
in for a blood test twice a day, whether one test was enough and what 
the chargemaster cost for both was going to look like.  
 But most of the time the other part of my brain took over, the 
part that remembered my terror during those blackouts and the overrid-
ing fear . . . that lingered in someone whose chest had been sawed open 
and whose heart had been stopped. As far as I was concerned, they could 
have tested my blood 10 times a day if they thought that was best. They 
could have paid as much as they wanted to that nurse’s aide with the 
scale or to the woman who flawlessly, without even a sting, took my 
blood. The doctor who had given me an angiogram the afternoon before 
the surgery and then came in the following week to check on me became 
just a nice guy who cared, not someone who might be trying to add on an 
extra consult bill. 
 Id. Brill’s first-person account serves as a narrative of the complicated challenges that often 
face patients when confronted with a health concern—even the most well informed, con-
sumer-savvy patients. Stories like Brill’s are a reminder of the major differences between 
health care and every other consumer good; the same robust consumer protections in  
other industries are simply untranslatable to health care. See Mariner, supra note 98, at 
494-95 & fig.1. 
In that narrative, the patient is helpless and weak, believing in—and dependent on—the 
heroic goodness of the American provider. See Brill, supra note 121, at 39. No matter what 
legal or patient protections are in place, they are likely far from the patient’s mind; she’s not 
thinking about whether she’s been adequately informed of alternatives, the amount of her 
deductible, or the hospital’s price for the aspirin she is about to take. She, like Brill, is think-
ing about the pain—and experiencing the fear and uncertainty that accompany a health 
concern. 
 122. This could be referred to as health literacy. See Jessica J. Flinn, Comment, Person-
alizing Informed Consent: The Challenge of Health Literacy, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH  
L. & POL’Y 379, 379-87 (2009). 
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caused by the provider’s disclosure or lack thereof—that the treatment 
will be beneficial as compared with other treatment alternatives. If 
this patient had more information about the procedure—and particu-
larly more information about the clinically reasonable alternatives—
she would not have consented to it.  
The patient’s lack of information may be a result of many different 
causes. First, the provider may be able to take additional action that 
would address the lack of information on the part of the patient. Per-
haps the provider has not adequately conveyed risks, benefits, and al-
ternatives to the patient. This could be intentional—a product of the 
provider feeling that either the risks and benefits are not worth disclo-
sure, or this may occur in situations in which the provider strongly 
supports the procedure and does not want to dissuade the patient from 
choosing that course of care. It could also be negligent; perhaps the 
provider unreasonably believes that the additional information is of no 
value. Or, perhaps, the provider is simply ignorant as to whether or 
not the procedure is beneficial; here, she is unaware of the infor-
mation—it is not readily known even to the experts.  
Ultimately, this patient consents to a procedure without fully 
grasping that the procedure will confer no clinical benefit. In this sce-
nario, the informed consent given is incomplete; a patient cannot con-
sent to a procedure for which he is not sufficiently aware of the risks, 
benefits, and alternatives. As a result, this patient may delegate deci-
sion-making because of his or her lack of expertise. As scholars have 
noted, some patients do not feel qualified to make a medical decision 
on their own behalf. Indeed, “in everyday practice, patients typically 
delegate decision making to their physicians, leading to some decisions 
that are made without good information on the patient’s true prefer-
ences.”123 Where the patient feels uncertain or uncomfortable in his 
ability to make a decision, it is the provider’s opinion that fills the vac-
uum.124 The patient intentionally cedes the protection of informed  
consent. 
In these situations, it is clear how unsatisfying the legal and patient 
protections of informed consent can be. The study of bioethics trumpets 
the importance of patient autonomy,125 but in these situations, the pa-
tient wants to trust and follow. The law recognizes the fundamental 
nature of informed consent,126 but unknowledgeable and stressed pa-
tients do not adequately deliberate. And the most shrewd patient may 
                                                                                                                  
 123. See Wennberg et al., supra note 32, at 1565. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See Kapp, supra note 103, at 93 (noting that “autonomy is the preeminent bioethical 
value” in the United States). 
 126. See Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex “Marriage” Through Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1687, 1767 (1997) (noting that informed consent is “a fundamental value in much 
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know that computed tomography (“CT”) scans are overused, or that 
brand name pharmaceuticals are often no more effective than gener-
ics, but may—in these situations—want to be “better safe than sorry.” 
As a result, many clinical situations may still resemble scenes from 
the pre-Canterbury days.127 However, as the subsequent Section ar-
gues, in certain scenarios, increased informed consent should save the 
system money by limiting excessive health care. It is these scenarios 
in which fraud-based overtreatment enforcement may be beneficial. 
B.   The Emerging Conservatism of the American Patient 
Surprisingly perhaps, when given the ability to choose, recent data 
support the conclusion that Americans are actually quite conservative 
in their treatment decisions. Numerous recent studies have demon-
strated that Americans’ treatment wishes are too often not reflected in 
the type of care they ultimately receive128—giving rise to a problem of 
“unwanted care,” especially at the end of life.129 As has been noted, “the 
amount of surgery that can be justified on the basis of traditional prac-
tice guidelines actually exceeds the amount of surgery that patients 
want when fully informed.”130  
American patients, when presented with accurate information, of-
ten choose to abstain from treatment.131 According to a recent survey, 
more than 51% of respondents would elect not to consent to a cancer 
screen if told that the screen resulted in one or more patients who were 
overtreated per one life saved from cancer.132 Even though between 35 
                                                                                                                  
American political theory and legal practice”); Donald T. Ridley, Informed Consent, Informed 
Refusal, Informed Choice – What Is It That Makes a Patient’s Medical Treatment Decisions 
Informed?, 20 MED. & L. 205, 205 (2001) (calling informed consent a “fundamental ethical 
and legal doctrine”). 
 127. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (establishing phy-
sicians’ obligation to disclose various information to a patient before taking action). 
 128. See Moulton & King, supra note 22, at 94. 
 129. Rauch, supra note 1 (documenting the work of Dr. Angelo Volandes, who strives to 
achieve better informed consent through the use of videos and conversation when making 
treatment decisions). “Unwanted treatment is a particularly confounding problem because 
it is not a product of malevolence but a by-product of two strengths of American medical 
culture: the system’s determination to save lives, and its technological virtuosity.” Id. 
 130. Wennberg et al., supra note 32, at 1566; see also Eisler & Hansen, supra note 13 
(noting that the existence of “mandatory second opinion program[s]” result in a notable drop 
in the amount of surgeries performed that were more likely to be done unnecessarily). 
 131. Moulton & King, supra note 22, at 88 (“In the absence of complete information, in-
dividuals frequently opt for procedures they would not otherwise choose. Mounting clinical 
evaluative evidence suggests that the number of surgical procedures performed, even when 
justified by practice guidelines, actually exceeds patients’ desires when they are fully in-
formed through a shared decision-making process.”). 
 132. See Odette Wegwarth & Gerd Gigerenzer, Overdiagnosis and Overtreatment: Eval-
uation of What Physicians Tell Their Patients About Screening Harms, 173 JAMA INTERNAL 
MED. 2086, 2086-87 (2013) (defining overdiagnosis as “the detection of pseudodisease—
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and 30% of respondents would still elect the cancer screening, even if 
there were between ten and one hundred patients who, as a result of 
that screening, were overtreated and only one patient saved from can-
cer,133 69% of patients surveyed “indicated that they would not start 
screening if overdiagnosis was as high (i.e., ≥ 10 cases per 1 life saved) 
as it is in mammography and PSA testing.”134 
When patients are fully informed, or when they are provided with 
a shared decision-making model, their consent to surgery plummets—
from knee surgery (“only 15 percent of those with symptoms and x-ray 
evidence of degenerative changes indicating surgery actually wanted 
it after being fully informed”135) to seven afflictions “commonly” ad-
dressed by surgery, where, following shared decision-making, consent 
to surgery dropped 21 to 44%.136 Again, these data demonstrate that 
when given an opportunity to deliberate, patients decline treatment at 
a substantial rate. 
Part of the patients’ problems stem from the failure of providers to 
adequately inform them of important information—information that 
may not have anything to do with traditional side effects or threats, 
but information that specifically deals with the risk of overtreatment 
and overdiagnosis.137 Importantly, in a recent study, only 9.5% of pa-
tients “said that their physician had informed them about the possibil-
ity of overdiagnosis and overtreatment when discussing cancer screen-
ing,”138 but “80% said they wanted to hear about potential harms before 
undergoing screening.”139 Unsurprisingly, “[w]hen a national sample of 
412 US primary care physicians . . . was asked about the extent of over-
diagnosis for mammography screening and PSA testing[,] only 33.9% 
and 42.9%, respectively, were able to provide a correct estimate.”140 
C.   An Example of the Conflict: End of Life Care 
A specific example of the conflict between what patients want and 
the clinical care they ultimately receive is care administered at the end 
of life.141 At the end of life, overtreatment is defined as the administra-
                                                                                                                  
screening-detected abnormalities that meet the pathologic definition of cancer but will never 
progress to cause symptoms”). 
 133. Id. at 2087 & fig. 
 134. Id. at 2087. 
 135. Wennberg et al., supra note 32, at 1566. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Wegwarth & Gigerenzer, supra note 132, at 2087. 
 138. Id. at 2086. 
 139. Laurie Barclay, Physicians Mum About Overdiagnosis Risks, Patients Say, MEDSCAPE 
(Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/813034 (on file with author). 
 140. See Wegwarth & Gigerenzer, supra note 132, at 2087. 
 141. See Lallemand, supra note 35, at 3. 
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tion of “intensive care . . . when alternative care would have been pre-
ferred by the patient and family” and “excessive use of antibiotics.”142 
This conflict may not be abating in any meaningful way; with a recent 
Brown University study noting that “[a]lthough the CDC reports that 
decedents aged 65 years and older are more likely to die at home, [the] 
results are not consistent with the notion that there is a trend toward 
less aggressive care.”143 Specifically,  
[a]dvocates hoped that the continued spread of hospice and palliative 
care would reduce the observed patterns of aggressive care. However, 
our findings in a population of fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries 
do not bear this out. . . . Despite expansion of hospice care and previ-
ously reported growth of hospital-based palliative care teams, there 
were increases in the use of an ICU; hospitalizations in the last 90 
days of life; and the rates of transitions, including transitions in the 
last 3 days of life, from 2000 to 2009.144 
Medicare spending at the end of life constitutes a large overall per-
centage of total expenditures in the program. A recently published 
study concluded that the average per capita spending for Medicare 
beneficiaries peaked at age ninety-six at $16,145.145 This is more than 
double the average Medicare per capita spending for beneficiaries at 
age seventy—that amount was $7,566 for the year.146  Overall, 28%—
about $170 billion of the $554 billion in total expenditures for the Med-
icare program in 2011—was spent during the beneficiaries’ last six 
months of life.147  
The authors of the study noted that the results could “inform efforts 
to improve care management for Medicare’s oldest beneficiaries” and 
wondered “whether Medicare’s oldest old beneficiaries are getting the 
appropriate mix of services in the most appropriate setting, and 
                                                                                                                  
 142. Id. 
 143. Joan M. Teno et al., Change in End-of-Life Care for Medicare Beneficiaries, 309 
JAMA 470, 476 (2013) (noting, for example, that intensive care unit use in the last month of 
life increased from 24.3% (in 2000) to 26.3% (in 2005) to 29.2% (in 2009)). 
 144. Id. at 474 (footnote omitted); see also Christian Nordqvist, End-of-Life Care for El-
derly Often Too Aggressive, MNT (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/ 
articles/255991.php (“We need to transform our health care system, from one based on fee-
for-service medicine for the majority of Americans, to one where people are not paid for just 
one more ICU day. Instead we need a system where doctors and hospitals are paid for deliv-
ering high-quality, patient-centered care that understands the dying patient’s needs and ex-
pectations and develops a care plan that honors them. We need publicly reported quality 
measures that hold institutions accountable to the standard of patient-centered care for the 
dying.” (quoting Joan M. Teno)). 
 145. See Patricia Neuman et al., Medicare per Capita Spending by Age and Service: New 
Data Highlights Oldest Beneficiaries, 34 HEALTH AFF. 335, 336 (2015). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Jason Millman, It’s Time to Bury the ‘Death Panel’ Myth for Good. Is this the Way 
to Do It?, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/ 
wp/2014/09/17/its-time-to-bury-the-death-panel-myth-for-good-is-this-the-way-to-do-it/.   
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whether more could be done to improve the management and quality 
of their care.”148 At the same time, commentators decry the treachery 
that comes with dying in modern America—made all the more con-
founding where “[m]ost people want to drift gently from life, optimally 
at home, surrounded by people they love” but that “[e]pidemiological 
and health service studies paint an alarmingly different picture.”149  
Surveys of American patients back up this sentiment—as has been 
noted, most “patients who recognize that they are dying do not want 
[aggressive] care.”150 A 2014 poll sponsored by Compassion and 
Choices, the end-of-life advocacy organization, found that 24% of older 
Americans said “that either they or a family member [had] experienced 
excessive or unwanted medical treatment, the equivalent of about 25 
million people.”151 A second recent study, reliant upon family members’ 
responses to a loved one’s recent death, concluded that suffering at end 
of life is actually increasing, based largely upon overly aggressive and 
often unnecessary treatments near the end of life.152 Finally, the Insti-
tute of Medicine’s (“IOM”) Dying in America report, published in the 
fall of 2014, presented a number of recommendations—including call-
ing for a reduction in the “use of expensive and unnecessary medical 
services that don’t actually match up with what the patient wants.”153 
The report “blamed a fee-for-service medical system in which ‘perverse 
incentives’ exist for doctors and hospitals to choose the most aggressive 
                                                                                                                  
 148. Neuman et al., supra note 145, at 338. 
 149. Ira Byock, Opinion, Dying Shouldn’t Be So Brutal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2015, 2:30 
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/dying-shouldnt-be-so-brutal/?_r=1. 
 150. Jennifer W. Mack et al., Associations Between End-of-Life Discussion Characteris-
tics and Care Received Near Death: A Prospective Cohort Study, 30 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 
4387, 4389, 4394 (2012) (concluding that patients who had end of life conversations were 
“less likely to receive aggressive [end of life] care”); see also Terminally Ill Cancer Patients 
Who Discuss End-of-Life Care Early Can Avoid Needlessly Aggressive Treatment Later on, 
Study Finds, DANA-FARBER CANCER INST. (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.dana-farber.org/ 
Newsroom/News-Releases/terminally-ill-cancer-patients-who-discuss-end-of-life-care-early-
can-avoid-needlessly-aggressive-treatment.aspx (noting that the decision to opt for “less ag-
gressive care, less chemotherapy, and less acute care” can “often bring a higher quality of 
life to a dying individual’s final days”). 
 151. See 25 Million Older Americans Have Experienced Unwanted or Excessive  
Medical Treatment, Survey Suggests, COMPASSION & CHOICES (July 29, 2014), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/25-million-older-americans-have-experienced-
unwanted-or-excessive-medical-treatment-survey-suggests-269070531.html [hereinafter 
25 Million Older Americans]. 
 152. See Jenny Gold, Study: Suffering at the End of Life Getting Worse, Not Better, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 3, 2015), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/study-suffering-at-
end-of-life-getting-worse-not-better/. 
 153. Millman, supra note 147. The report noted a “mismatch between the services most 
readily available to people near the end of life . . . and what they most often say they  
want.” Id. 
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care” and “inadequate training for those caring for the dying and phy-
sicians who default to life-saving treatment because they worry about 
liability.”154  
There are signs, however, that these results represent more than 
just observational data of America’s unique problem of overtreatment; 
perhaps, these data demonstrate American patients’ increasing re-
solve to address unwanted care at the end of life. Interestingly, the 
recent Compassion and Choices poll found that “older Americans 
strongly support holding doctors accountable when they fail to  
honor patients’ end-of-life healthcare wishes.”155 This includes “both in-
centives and sanctions to ensure physicians respect patients’  
preferences.”156  
Specifically, 65% supported “withholding payment to healthcare 
providers who fail to honor [patients’] end-of-life medical wishes,” and 
41% responded that “they would ‘take legal action’ . . . in response to 
unwanted medical treatment.”157 Chief Program Officer Mickey Mac-
Intyre, responding to the survey results, noted, “We need carrot-and-
stick policies that encourage medical providers to learn their patients’ 
end-of-life healthcare wishes, and to honor them.”158 A presentation of 
one such plausible legal “stick”—linking a bolstered informed consent 
doctrine to the anti-fraud tools commonly employed by the DOJ—
follows below. 
IV.   ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORKS 
It may not necessarily be the case that the substance of the doctrine 
of informed consent is weak—because it is not, at least on paper—but 
the limitations and challenges imposed on the actual enforcement of 
the doctrine have hamstrung its robustness.159 Granted, the doctrine’s 
provisions—focused on patient-protective autonomy and disclosure 
from the provider to provide an opportunity for rational deliberation—
                                                                                                                  
 154. Matt Sedensky, Study: Americans Endure Unwanted Care near Death, YAHOO! 
NEWS (Sept. 17, 2014, 2:13 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/study-americans-endure-unwanted-
care-near-death-181105405.html. 
 155. 25 Million Older Americans, supra note 151. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Jessica Berg, All for One and One for All: Informed Consent and Public Health, 
50 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2012) (documenting the limitations to the doctrine in the public health 
context); Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, Prudent Precaution in Clinical Trials of 
Nanomedicines, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 831, 835 (2012) (noting the “limitations  
of . . . informed consent” in clinical trials); Andrew Iverson Almand, Note, A Mother’s Worst 
Nightmare, What’s Left Unsaid: The Lack of Informed Consent in Obstetrical Practices, 18 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 565, 574 (2012) (“Given the currently weak state of the doctrine 
of informed consent in obstetrics, a physician need not do much to comport with applicable 
state law and judicial precedent on the subject.”). 
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do not always fit perfectly in every clinical situation.160 But beyond any 
faults in its makeup, it has arguably been the enforceability of its pro-
tections that have lagged. These limitations—many of them court-
made constraints that arise as a result of the doctrine being channeled 
into a medical malpractice theory—are briefly explored before the ar-
gument for a fraud-based solution is presented.  
A.   The Malpractice Theory 
The channeling of informed consent into the negligence-based med-
ical malpractice action that it currently resembles has erected road-
blocks that are “particularly problematic for plaintiffs who sue based 
on failure to disclose treatment alternatives.”161 As a result, these lim-
itations have led to a general consensus that the doctrine is weak.162 
Patients, required to carry the mast of the ultimate autonomy-protec-
tive doctrine, are often faced with long odds in bringing a negligence 
tort action based upon a lack of informed consent.163 The obstacles in-
clude the variant and vague disclosure standards,164 the constricting 
causation standard,165 and the requirement that the plaintiff prove 
that she suffered demonstrable harm.166  
But beyond limiting the applicability of the doctrine for patient en-
forcement, these limitations also prevent other interested parties—
particularly, payers—from using the doctrine as a platform from which 
to bring legal claims against providers or entities. If providers fail to 
achieve adequate informed consent—perhaps, failing to disclose alter-
native and more cost-effective treatments—before treating a patient, 
                                                                                                                  
 160. See, e.g., Brill, supra note 121, at 38-39. 
 161. Krause, supra note 27, at 308. 
 162. See TENNENHOUSE, supra note 104 (“As a result, even though it is a very common 
secondary theory of liability in medical negligence cases, informed consent itself is usually a 
weak theory unless the risk is of an extremely sensitive nature such as loss of childbearing 
or sexual capacity, cosmetic deformity or severe neurologic impairment.”). See generally 
Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley, Challenges to Informed Consent, 5 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 
ORG. REP. 832 (2004) (documenting various weaknesses of the doctrine). 
 163. See TENNENHOUSE, supra note 104 (discussing the weaknesses of the informed con-
sent doctrine). 
 164. See Krause, supra note 27, at 314-17. 
 165. See id. at 317-20; see also TENNENHOUSE, supra note 104 (“In cases based on lack of 
informed consent, causation is often difficult to prove because the plaintiff must show that 
the indicated intervention would have been refused had the patient known of a specific risk 
or other factor that was not disclosed by the physician.”). 
 166. See Krause, supra note 27, at 321 (“To the extent that a physician fails to inform 
the patient of a therapy that has fewer risks or a better outcome than the proposed treat-
ment, the patient should be able to proceed under the traditional theory. But what if the 
nondisclosed therapy was more risky than the proposed therapy, yet had a lower risk of 
certain side effects that were particularly important to that patient? For example, a patient 
with breast cancer may be told that her only surgical option is a radical mastectomy, and not 
informed of the possibility of a less disfiguring lumpectomy. If the mastectomy cures her 
cancer, what ‘injury’ has she sustained?”). 
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they are not just disrespecting the patient’s autonomy which may re-
sult in harm to the patient, but they are also causing financial harm 
to the third-party payer. Clearly, from the third-party payer’s perspec-
tive, it should not be reimbursing the provider for any administered 
care lacking in complete informed consent. This is particularly the 
case, however, when both the service provided is of questionable clini-
cal value and the patient was not adequately made aware of reasona-
ble alternatives—including the alternative to abstain from a procedure 
altogether. In fact, by administering care before discussing all relevant 
information regarding treatment alternatives, the provider could be 
tainting the entire episode of care for the patient.  
As a result, even when the patient is unable to claim demonstrable 
physical harm as a result of the provider’s failure to disclose reasona-
ble alternative treatment options, the payer may still experience fi-
nancial harm. To the extent the third-party payer is a government en-
tity—particularly, to the extent the third-party payer is the federal 
government administering the Medicare program—powerful anti-
fraud tools are available. These tools may be utilized by the federal 
government to prevent and punish care that—while maybe not result-
ing in physical harm to the patient—is financially harmful to the fed-
eral government because of the existence of a reasonable, more cost-
effective alternative treatment.167  
B.   Enforceable Informed Consent and the FCA 
Under the current construct, for many cases in which the patient 
struggles to articulate both (1) a demonstrable harm, and (2) the fact 
that the harm is caused by deficient informed consent, the third-party 
payer is left without any legal remedy. And, as a result, in these situ-
ations—typically when the payer (Medicare) reimburses the physician 
for treatment following allegedly incomplete or deficient disclosure of 
reasonable treatment alternatives—the current regime fails to provide 
a remedy for the payer as well. But by linking the regulatory frame-
work to the third-party payer and not just the patient (i.e., recognizing 
that an additional party is harmed by the lack of adequate informed 
consent), the doctrine could provide a number of advantages.  
By virtue of the provider’s failure to secure informed consent by ad-
equately disclosing treatment alternatives, the episode of care is in 
some way deficient or defective. Here, the third-party payer would em-
phasize the primacy of informed consent within law and bioethics and 
                                                                                                                  
 167. For a discussion of what showing of harm is required under the FCA, see Joan H. 
Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government Harm Under 
the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121 (2001). 
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the stress medical care places upon the doctrine.168 Where the provider 
has failed to present all treatment alternatives, he has failed to secure 
adequate informed consent, and the care is either substandard or  
unnecessary (or both), and therefore, should not be care that is  
reimbursable.169  
More likely to be potentially legally viable,170 a slightly different ar-
gument focuses on those cases in which the physician has failed to dis-
close treatment alternatives, but the plaintiff is unable to prove either 
the harm necessary (under the current malpractice-based standard) or 
meet the daunting causation requirement. Again, the argument here 
is that the harm experienced by the Medicare program may be wholly 
unconnected to whether or not the patient can demonstrate a malprac-
tice-based tort claim.  
Under a new theory of informed consent suggested by this instant 
analysis, the third-party payer would be able to bring an FCA claim 
based upon a lack of informed consent against defendants (1) who rad-
ically overly-administered procedures when compared to other provid-
ers, (2) whose patients would not have elected to undergo those proce-
dures had they been made aware of the comparison data, and (3) who 
failed to disclose that an eminently reasonable clinical alternative ex-
isted. The payer here—the federal government—suffers harm as a re-
sult of the provider failing to present the complete picture of treatment 
alternatives; but under the current construct of informed consent, nei-
ther the patient nor the payer have any adequate legal recompense. 
The federal government, as third-party payer, however, under this 
new construct, would be able to pursue an FCA claim.  
Resembling other fraud-based regulation, the question of whether 
taxpayer harm occurred in these cases is a wholly separate and unre-
lated question from whether or not patient harm occurred;171 indeed, 
                                                                                                                  
 168. See Informed Consent, supra note 102 (explaining the doctrine of informed consent 
and highlighting its significance in clinical practice and bioethics). 
 169. This is the foundation of the DOJ’s certification theory under the FCA, wherein 
some aspect of care is deficient, and the DOJ argues that the care should not be reimbursa-
ble. See infra Part V. Here, where sufficient informed consent is not achieved, the same ar-
gument would take hold. 
 170. See infra Part V. Indeed, the argument that the payer is reimbursing for a medical 
service that is clinically worthless or nonbeneficial is typically more cognizable in these cases 
than the simpler argument that Medicare simply should not pay for deficient care.  
 171. In most FCA-based anti-fraud actions, whether or not patients were harmed—suf-
fered a legally-compensable harm—is legally irrelevant. Indeed, in the DOJ’s newest en-
forcement regime, whereby federal prosecutors target providers who may have knowingly 
retained an overpayment, an action can lie regardless of whether patient harm occurred or 
not. See generally Scott Stein & Brenna Jenny, Reply Briefs in Continuum Litigation Con-
tinue to Debate Over Nature of an “Obligation” Under FCA, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (Dec. 17, 
2014), http://fcablog.sidley.com/reply-briefs-in-continuum-litigation-continue-debate-over-
nature-of-an-obligation-under-fca/ (discussing dispute over obligations under the False 
Claims Act).  
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the questions are often completely unrelated. Undoubtedly, the Medi-
care program is harmed whenever a provider administers a procedure 
that is nonbeneficial and potentially unnecessary regardless of 
whether or not the patient suffers any physical harm as a result. Re-
conceiving of the harm in these cases from required patient harm to 
recognizing that whenever overtreatment is administered, the payer 
is harmed, gives the payer—here, the Medicare program—an enforce-
able legal remedy and a powerful tool to use against American over-
treatment. This tool would force providers into being cognizant about 
less costly clinical alternatives and push them into being as forthcom-
ing about utilization and cost as they are about supposed clinical ben-
efits for a proposed procedure. If a fully informed consumer-savvy pa-
tient would not want it, and the procedure is nonbeneficial (and ex-
poses that patient to risks associated with overtreatment), then why 
is Medicare paying for it?  
C.   Potential Benefits of Enforceable Informed Consent 
A more powerful notion of informed consent in this situation pro-
duces three desired results: it should (1) provide a remedy for the payer 
for those cases in which the current malpractice-based conception of 
informed consent is inapplicable; (2) force providers to disclose more 
information—with a particular focus on reasonable alternative treat-
ments (including, potentially, suggesting doing nothing in some cases); 
and (3) result in increased access to relevant information for patients, 
ultimately improving their clinical decisions. A strengthened doctrine, 
bolstered by the specter of fraud-based penalties looming over a pro-
vider for failing to disclose reasonable alternatives, would force more 
information into patients’ hands, consequently leading to smarter and 
more efficient health care decisions. If nothing else, increased infor-
mation in the hands of patients will lead to decisions by patients that 
more closely track their true wishes—which is, by itself, a positive de-
velopment.172 
First, this extended enforcement provides a remedy (and punish-
ment) for those “gap” cases that currently exist—those cases where in-
formed consent is clearly defective, but plaintiffs cannot meet the stric-
tures of negligence-based malpractice requirements like causation and 
harm. For these cases, the payer—here the federal government—
would have a clear remedy against the provider for failing  
to present all potential alternative treatment options. Further, and   
                                                                                                                  
 172. This is particularly the case, given the recent disappointing data on end-of-life care. 
See supra Section III.C. 
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perhaps more importantly, the provider would be punished for failing 
to secure adequate informed consent regardless of whether traditional 
patient harm occurs. 
Second, this new conception of informed consent pushes providers 
to ratchet up the amount of disclosures they make prior to performing 
a potentially nonbeneficial (or at least clinically borderline) procedure. 
This does not foreclose the possibility that a patient, after receiving 
complete information regarding potential treatment alternatives, 
would still choose to undergo a particular procedure, but it simply en-
sures that patients are receiving information relating to cost and al-
ternatives that may influence their choices of whether to undergo 
treatment in the first place. Again, the threat of enforcement—an 
FCA-led overtreatment investigation with the alleged violation based 
on a lack of informed consent—forces the provider to internalize that 
risk and increase the amount of disclosure he or she makes to the pro-
spective patient. 
Third, this extended enforcement framework would give patients 
more information to make the best clinical decision. As it exists now, 
patients may be easily swayed by the clinical opinion of their provider 
without sufficient and adequate legal protection. Currently, these pa-
tients have very little check on the power and persuasion of the pro-
vider. And in the end, neither the patient nor the taxpayer is well 
served by this non-system of enforcement.  
Coupling this observation with the current challenge and preva-
lence of overtreatment in American medicine makes clear that the pro-
vider’s failure to disclose all reasonable treatment alternatives may 
likely lead to further unnecessary treatments and excess expense 
within the American health care industry.173 Granted, using the stat-
utory tools available to the federal government for a failure to secure 
informed consent would constitute a departure from the historical use 
of the informed consent doctrine—and, to some extent, would subject 
a new enforcement regime to a critique that it is stretching the uses of 
the FCA beyond its intended application. But in many ways, usage of 
the doctrine—indeed, still reliant on overtreatment regulation’s pri-
mary tool of the FCA—would not constitute a major departure from 
the DOJ’s chosen tool to regulate and punish overtreatment. Further, 
using the FCA to protect the autonomy of the patient—not to punish 
or overrule the expertise of the provider—seems to be an entirely  
                                                                                                                  
 173. See Lallemand, supra note 35, at 3 (noting that “[o]vertreatment can . . . result from 
overdiagnosis, which results from efforts to identify and treat disease in its earliest stages 
when the disease might never actually progress and when a strategy such as watchful wait-
ing may have been preferred” and that “[e]xcessive treatment . . . leads to unnecessary 
harms”). 
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different exercise altogether. Again, if the patient chooses a nonbene-
ficial treatment that is marginally medically necessary, this regime 
would not apply. 
At root, the theory here is focused on the fact that the provider ad-
ministered care to the patient who, had she been aware of both (1) all 
of the alternatives, and (2) the clinical “aggressiveness”—based upon 
comparative information—with which her provider approached her 
health issue, would have never consented to undergo the procedure. 
And at the heart of the proposal, such application of the FCA makes 
intuitive sense; the American Bar Association had submitted a proposal 
mirroring these suggestions—but it was ultimately withdrawn.174 
However, beyond reconceptualizing usage of the FCA to target pro-
viders who fail to present alternative treatment options to their pa-
tients, there are formidable legal hurdles that this new overtreatment 
regulation theory must clear. And, in some ways, the law would have 
to evolve to allow this extended application of the informed consent 
doctrine. These important legal arguments—focused exclusively on us-
ing the FCA to regulate and investigate the failure to secure adequate 
informed consent—are presented below. 
V.   THE NEW LEGAL DOCTRINE 
A federal district court recently dismissed a relator’s FCA claim 
against medical device manufacturer Medtronic, Inc. (“Medtronic”).175 
The lawsuit was based upon Medtronic’s alleged failure to disclose con-
flicts of interest and for allegedly engaging in off-label marketing.176 In 
the opinion, the court unequivocally denied one of the relator’s main 
arguments—specifically, that Medtronic violated the FCA because it 
failed to secure adequate informed consent from patients.177 Noting 
that the relator’s “informed consent ‘scheme’ ” could not “form the basis 
for FCA liability because payment of Medicare claims does not require 
informed consent,” the court granted the dismissal.178 This decision 
                                                                                                                  
 174. See JEFFERY SNELL, ABA COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES, 106B, at 4-7 (2010); Pope, supra note 33, at 278 n.423 (noting that “recommen-
dations were eventually withdrawn”). 
 175. United States ex rel. Hartwig v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 3:11CV413-CWR-LRA, 2014 
WL 1324339, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2014). 
 176. Id. at *2. 
 177. Id. at *10-12. 
 178. Id. at *12. As strange as the decision may read to the layperson—that care admin-
istered without the patient’s informed consent is reimbursable by Medicare—the Hartwig 
case tracks the current legal structure that governs what is known as “certification” theory. 
One of the theories by which the federal government seeks to assert a quality of care-based 
violation of the FCA, prosecutors have to allege that the violation was material to the gov-
ernment’s decision to pay on the Medicare claim. See United States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. 
Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1510, 1512 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (noting that the certifica-
tion must be material to the decision to pay in order to be actionable under the FCA). 
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demonstrates the most daunting challenge for informed consent-based 
liability under the FCA—that informed consent has never been treated 
like a material component of the government’s reimbursement deci-
sions. And, given the current makeup of the legal regime, multiple 
pathways for fraud-based liability may be blocked. 
Generally, when seeking to regulate overtreatment or prevent the 
administration of unnecessary health services through the FCA, fed-
eral prosecutors have advanced three primary theories of liability.179 
Courts—including, most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court180—have 
shaped the application of these theories over the last fifteen years as 
the federal anti-fraud tools have been employed to regulate American 
providers that are allegedly administering overtreatment and provid-
ing unnecessary health care. These include (1) express certification, 
(2) implied certification, and (3) worthless services theories.181 
For this proposal, which seeks to use informed consent as the basis 
upon which to bring an FCA claim, there are four main legal argu-
ments—based on these three theories—upon which federal prosecu-
tors could rely. Specifically, these four potential theories of liability 
center on allegations that, as a result of the provider’s failure to obtain 
adequate informed consent: (1) the care was not administered in ac-
cordance with the general rules and regulations of the Medicare pro-
gram and was made fraudulent by an express certification to the fed-
eral government, (2) the care administered was in some way deficient 
or defective in quality, and billing for the care was made fraudulent 
under an implied certification theory, (3) the care administered was 
medically “worthless,” and the federal government was defrauded for 
having to pay for the worthless service, or (4) the care administered 
was not medically necessary and was made fraudulent by an express 
certification to the federal government. 
A.   The Legal Classification  
All four of these potential theories of liability feature a legal  
argument that relies on the fact that the failure to achieve adequate  
informed consent in some way taints the claim for reimbursement.  
At bottom, for these arguments, when the provider who fails to  
secure informed consent submits a claim for reimbursement, the federal   
                                                                                                                  
 179. See PollyBeth Hawk, Ready or Not: Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Poised to 
Transform Healthcare Reimbursement Model and Introduce New Fraud Targets Under the 
False Claims Act, 22 ANNALS HEALTH L. 43, 67 (2013) (noting that quality-based fraud in-
vestigations are “generally based on” three theories). 
 180. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 
(2016). 
 181. See Hawk, supra note 179, at 67.  
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government is defrauded by paying for that service. To the casual  
observer, any of these four theories could seemingly be alleged  
successfully. 
However, based upon current precedent, not all of these theories of 
liability have a substantial chance of success when raised in federal 
court. And while these arguments may have an intuitive attractive-
ness, as the theories are currently construed, federal prosecutors al-
leging violations of the FCA based upon insufficient informed consent 
likely face an uphill battle due to a number of court-made limitations 
on the theories. The first three of these theories—arguments based 
solely upon express certification, implied certification, and worthless 
service theories—are presented first, followed by the one theory—
based upon medical necessity—that may be most likely to succeed. 
 1.   Express Certification 
The first potential theory of liability that could be alleged is a vio-
lation of the FCA by virtue of the provider’s express certification that 
the care administered “complie[d] with all applicable Medicare and/or 
Medicaid laws, regulations, and program instructions for payment.”182 
For the instant analysis, this can be referred to as the “express certifi-
cation” theory of liability. 
Generally, express certification claims have been referred to as 
claims “that contain[] a false affirmative declaration of compliance 
with a contract provision, statute, or regulation material to the gov-
ernment’s decision to pay.”183 This allegation would not depend upon 
whether or not the care administered was deemed reasonable and nec-
essary by the Medicare program, but instead would allege that the fail-
                                                                                                                  
 182. See HEALTH INSURANCE CLAIM FORM, CMS, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/ 
CMS-Forms/CMS-Forms/Downloads/CMS1500.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
 183. Christopher L. Martin, Jr., Comment, Reining in Lincoln’s Law: A Call to Limit the 
Implied Certification Theory of Liability Under the False Claims Act, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 227, 
239 (2013). 
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ure to secure informed consent violates Medicare regulations—be-
cause, indeed, it does.184 A provider who fails to achieve sufficient in-
formed consent clearly violates Medicare’s rules.185 
Consequently, by attesting to the fact that the care was adminis-
tered in compliance with all of Medicare’s governing rules when sub-
mitting the claim form for reimbursement, the provider transforms 
that failure to comply with Medicare’s informed consent rules into a 
false statement to Medicare. This becomes a false claim to the federal 
government—and an alleged violation of the FCA. However, in order 
to demonstrate the express certification theory on this claim, the DOJ 
would have to show that this certification was in some way material to 
the government’s decision to pay.186  
Even though application of this theory seems relatively straightfor-
ward, there are court-made limitations that will present challenges for 
the application of express certification theory here. Most prominently, 
courts have limited the application of express certification theory to 
claims that certify compliance with a statute or regulation that is ma-
terial to the government’s decision to pay the claim.187 That is, if the 
provider certifies compliance with a Medicare statute or regulation 
and that certification is not material to the government’s decision to 
pay on the claim, express certification theory is inapplicable. In some 
ways, this limitation resembles the causation requirement in the cur-
rent malpractice regime; similarly, if the government would have paid 
the claim anyway—regardless of the certification of compliance—then 
the false attestation could not have caused harm to the Medicare  
program.  
The DOJ would allege that the provider who failed to achieve suffi-
cient informed consent made a false statement when he certified com-
pliance with all of Medicare’s rules and regulations.188 But very 
                                                                                                                  
 184. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(b)(2) (2015) (“The patient or his or her representative (as 
allowed under State law) has the right to make informed decisions regarding his or her care. 
The patient’s rights include being informed of his or her health status, being involved in care 
planning and treatment, and being able to request or refuse treatment. This right must not 
be construed as a mechanism to demand the provision of treatment or services deemed med-
ically unnecessary or inappropriate.”). For surgeries, a Medicare condition of participation 
requires “[a] properly executed informed consent form for the operation” that “must be in the 
patient’s chart before surgery.” 42 C.F.R. § 482.51(b)(2) (2015). 
 185. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.51(b)(2). 
 186. See John T. Brennan, Jr. & Michael W. Paddock, Limitations on the Use of the False 
Claims Act to Enforce Quality of Care Standards, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 37, 48 (2008); 
Martin, supra note 183, at 239; see also United States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. Healthcorp, Inc., 
914 F. Supp. 1507, 1510 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (stating that withholding of information critical 
to the government’s decision to pay claims is the essence of a false claim).  
 187. See Brennan & Paddock, supra note 186, at 48; Martin, supra note 183, at 239. 
 188. See HEALTH INSURANCE CLAIM FORM, supra note 182. The certification contains the 
following: “In submitting this claim for payment from federal funds, I certify  
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quickly, this argument may hit a snag.189 Medicare has two different 
types of conditions—conditions of payment190 and conditions of partic-
ipation (“CoP”).191 CoPs have been described as “federal regulations 
with which particular healthcare facilities must comply in order to 
participate” in the Medicare program.192 Beyond being important for 
entrance into the program, providers must comply with CoPs “to main-
tain good standing in the Medicare program.”193  
Medicare includes its informed consent requirement as a CoP 
within its regulations—not a condition of payment.194 One of Medi-
care’s CoPs clearly requires that each patient “has the right to make 
informed decisions regarding his or her care.”195 Historically, as a  
result of this classification, the requirement of informed consent would 
not be material to the government’s decision to pay196 because “Medi-
care COPs are not explicitly referred to in the relevant claims’ certifi-
cations, and have not been determined to be material to the payment 
decision on any ad hoc, case-by-case basis.”197 However, with the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Escobar, where the court noted that the 
                                                                                                                  
that . . . this claim, whether submitted by me or on my behalf by my designated billing com-
pany, complies with all applicable Medicare and/or Medicaid laws, regulations, and program 
instructions for payment . . . .” Id. 
 189. It remains uncertain what the effect of the Escobar case will be on this analysis for 
express certification. Under Escobar, it appears that the distinction between a condition of 
payment and condition of participation is irrelevant as to whether or not the decision to pay 
was material. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 
1989, 1994, 1996 (2016). In so holding, the Court does not appear to limit its decision on this 
question only to implied certification (the question of the case before it), suggesting it may 
reach express certification. Id.  
 190. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 424 (2015) (providing conditions of payment regulations 
within Medicare). 
 191. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 482 (2015) (delineating conditions of participation for  
hospitals). 
 192. See Medicare CoPs and Interpretive Guidelines, AM. ASSOCIATION NURSE 
ANESTHETISTS, http://www.aana.com/advocacy/federalgovernmentaffairs/Pages/Medicare-
Conditions-of-Participation.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
 193. See Nicole Huberfeld, Be Not Afraid of Change: Time to Eliminate the Corporate 
Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 14 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 243, 280 (2004). 
 194. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(b) (2015). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Brennan & Paddock, supra note 186, at 48; see also United States ex rel. Conner v. 
Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1219-21 (10th Cir. 2008); United States ex rel. 
Gross v. AIDS Research All.-Chi., 415 F.3d 601, 604 (7th Cir. 2005); Mikes v. Straus, 274 
F.3d 687, 701-02 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 197. Brennan & Paddock, supra note 186, at 48; see also Martin, supra note 183, at 244-
45 (noting precedent in which relator’s claim was rejected because the applicable Medicare 
regulation did not expressly condition payment on compliance with its terms.). Further, 
courts’ decisions “often hinge on the distinction between conditions of payment and condi-
tions of participation.” Katherine A. Lauer et al., Violations of Payment/ Participation Con-
ditions as Predicates for False Claims, ABA (2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/ 
litigation/committees/criminal/email/winter2012/winter2012-0402-violations-conditions-
payment-participation-predicates-false-claims.html. 
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distinction between CoPs and conditions of payment can both form the 
basis of an FCA claim (assuming the violation is material and scienter 
is met), this distinction no longer appears to be dispositive.198 
The historical distinction between CoPs and conditions of payment 
is due largely to a determination that CoPs—as opposed to conditions 
of payment—are enforceable by an administrative remedy, which is 
exclusion from the Medicare program.199 Alternatively, conditions of 
payment “are those which, if the government knew they were not being 
followed, might cause it to actually refuse payment.”200 Of course, the 
relative dearth of providers excluded from the Medicare program for 
providing overtreatment demonstrates the lack of utility of the current 
remedy. Prior to Escobar, practitioners had noted that allowing an 
FCA action based upon a CoP would widen applicability of the FCA 
well beyond its intended application.201 Of course, the full effect of the 
recent Escobar case on this argument, at time of publication, is un-
known, but appears to remove one of the major hurdles to this theory 
of liability. 
 2.   Implied Certification  
Second, in most federal circuits,202 and very recently recognized by 
the Supreme Court in Escobar,203 federal prosecutors can argue that 
an FCA violation occurred under an implied certification theory.204 
Within this theory, the prosecutor could allege that by virtue of sub-
mitting the bill for repayment, the provider was impliedly certifying 
                                                                                                                  
 198. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 
1996 (2016) (noting that “[d]efendants can be liable for violating requirements even if they 
were not expressly designated as conditions of payment. Conversely, even when a require-
ment is expressly designated a condition of payment, not every violation of such a require-
ment gives rise to liability.”). 
 199. See Conner, 543 F.3d at 1219-21 (“It is therefore with good reason that the agencies 
of the federal government, rather than the courts, manage Medicare participation in the first 
instance in cooperation with the states and accreditation organizations.”). 
 200. Id. at 1220-21 (“There is thus no basis in either law or logic to adopt an express false 
certification theory that turns every violation of a Medicare regulation into the subject of an 
FCA qui tam suit.”). 
 201. See Lauer et al., supra note 197 (“Expanding the reach of the FCA by conflating 
conditions of payment with requirements that are actually conditions of participation is nei-
ther consistent with established case law nor good public policy. The mechanisms in place 
for enforcing conditions of participation have been thoughtfully and thoroughly developed by 
the agencies overseeing the myriad of federal health care programs. Permitting qui tam re-
lators to bring actions purporting to enforce these regulations creates uncertainty among 
health care providers and will result in additional costly litigation.”). 
 202. See Martin, supra note 183, at 242 (noting that the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Cir-
cuits have not yet recognized implied certification theory). But, in early 2015, the Fourth 
Circuit recognized the implied certification theory for the first time. Ellyce Cooper & Collin 
Wedel, Fourth Circuit Recognizes Implied Certification Theory, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (Jan. 15, 
2015), http://fcablog.sidley.com/fourth-circuit-recognizes-implied-certification-theory/. 
 203. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1995. 
 204. See Hawk, supra note 179, at 68. 
940  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:901 
 
compliance with all of the rules and regulations that govern the Med-
icare program.205 This theory’s main distinction from express  
certification centers on the fact that the implied certification theory 
features an implied “statement” that is satisfied by the submission of 
the claim for reimbursement, and not an express attestation. No “af-
firmative declaration” is required.206 
Implied certification theory is typically seen as the second-best cer-
tification theory—particularly because, before Escobar, the theory was 
not universally recognized in the federal courts.207 Under implied cer-
tification, it is irrelevant whether or not the form includes a certifica-
tion that the care complied with all rules and regulations of the Medi-
care program; indeed, by the act of submitting the bill, the provider 
impliedly certifies compliance. Where express certification is unavail-
able to the federal prosecutors, implied certification theory takes its 
place. For the instant analysis, the provider who fails to secure suffi-
cient informed consent but then seeks reimbursement for the admin-
istered medical service would allegedly be in violation of the implied 
certification theory under the FCA. By virtue of submitting the claim 
for reimbursement, the provider is impliedly certifying compliance 
with Medicare’s rules; a provider who fails to secure adequate in-
formed consent is violating those programmatic provisions.208 
Nevertheless, starting with the often-cited Mikes v. Straus,209 and 
spreading to other circuits nationwide,210 courts had been hesitant to 
allow FCA liability for implied certification. In the summer of 2016, 
however, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the implied certification 
theory and clearly concluded that a CoP violation—and not just an ex-
press condition of payment—could provide the basis for an FCA 
claim based on implied certification in the context of a state Medicaid 
program, as long as the violation was material.211 As a result, a  
 
  
                                                                                                                  
 205. See Joan H. Krause, “Promises to Keep”: Health Care Providers and the Civil False 
Claims Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1396 (2002) (“Both the government and qui tam rela-
tors have argued that participation in Medicare and Medicaid entails an implied certification 
that the claimant will abide by all relevant program statutes, rules, and  
regulations.”). 
 206. See Martin, supra note 183, at 240. 
 207. See id. at 241 (noting that the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have not recog-
nized implied certification); Cooper & Wedel, supra note 202 (noting that the Fourth Circuit 
recognized implied certification in 2015). 
 208. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(a), (b)(2) (2015) (noting informed consent provisions under 
Medicare program). 
 209. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 210. See Martin, supra note 183, at 242. 
 211. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 
1993-94 (2016). 
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condition of payment violation is not automatically material under the 
FCA, and a violation of a CoP within Medicare seemingly could be ma-
terial, forming the basis for an FCA claim.212 
Although the complete ramifications of the Escobar case are not yet 
known, it appears that, in some ways, it tracks the federal circuit court 
decisions in the First, D.C., and Federal Circuits, andnot the tougher 
Mikes test.213 These circuits have allowed for broader application of the 
implied certification theory, and under Escobar, it appears that the 
implied certification theory has been clearly entrenched in FCA juris-
prudence.214 Whether that opens the door to an implied certification 
claim based on a lack of informed consent—and how potentially widely 
it does so—remains an open question at the time of this writing. 
 3.   Worthless Services 
Third, the DOJ can attempt to tie the FCA to the failure to secure 
adequate informed consent by the “worthless services” theory.215 Un-
der this theory, the government alleges that care administered to the 
Medicare beneficiary was so deficient that paying for the service 
amounts to paying for nothing.216 And, by getting paid for administer-
ing the worthless service, the provider is recovering an ill-gotten gain 
from the federal government; consequently, that provider is defraud-
ing the federal government under the FCA. For services that fail to 
improve the health of the patient and, in fact, subject the patient to a 
number of increased health risks, the worthless services theory makes 
intuitive sense.  
For the instant analysis, the worthless services theory may align 
easily with the claims that are based on a lack of informed consent. 
For nonbeneficial health services for which the patient was not pro-
vided with sufficient treatment alternatives, the procedure that ulti-
mately takes place is undoubtedly worthless. It would not be a stretch 
to allege they were clinically worthless and, consequently, legally 
                                                                                                                  
 212. Id. 
 213. See Martin, supra note 183, at 247. 
 214. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 
379-80 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that implied certification still depends upon a showing that 
the violation would have been material to the government’s decision to pay). 
 215. See, e.g., Extendicare Health Services Inc. Agrees to Pay $38 Million to Settle False 
Claims Act Allegations Relating to the Provision of Substandard Nursing Care and Medically 
Unnecessary Rehabilitation Therapy, DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/pr/extendicare-health-services-inc-agrees-pay-38-million-settle-false-claims-
act-allegations (noting the government allegations that the defendant “billed Medicare and 
Medicaid for materially substandard nursing services that were so deficient that they were 
effectively worthless and billed Medicare for medically unreasonable and unnecessary reha-
bilitation therapy services”) (emphasis added). 
 216. See United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1050-54 
(9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing the worthless services theory and allowing the plaintiff to amend 
complaint after defendant allegedly falsified control sample test results). 
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worthless under the FCA. Still, in order to successfully allege that the 
provider billed for worthless services, the services must be so deficient 
that billing for them resembles billing for no care at all.217 Care that 
provides the basis for an informed consent-based liability case may not 
likely be classified as worthless, especially because, in those cases, 
there is no allegation that the care’s quality itself was woefully defi-
cient. Instead, these patients were treated—but were administered 
care that they would not have chosen. This legal harm seems more 
complex than the more straightforward worthless services theory, at 
least as it is currently recognized. 
 4.   Fraud Based on Medical Necessity  
Finally, for cases in which the consent at issue was not completely 
informed, the federal government—through the DOJ—could argue 
that when the provider seeks reimbursement for that service, he 
should not be entitled to payment; indeed, Medicare, the argument 
goes, should only pay for medically necessary services. And—im-
portantly—a service that is administered without adequate informed 
consent is medical care that cannot be called medically necessary.218 
For the instant analysis, this argument can be deemed the “medical 
necessity” argument, and—lacking the legal barriers that may limit 
the other theories mentioned above—this allegation may be the likeli-
est of the four to succeed. 
Specifically, this theory represents “express certification” in typical 
FCA parlance, because when the claim is submitted to the federal gov-
ernment, the provider attests to the fact that all care was reasonable 
and necessary—in accordance with Medicare’s statutory requirement 
that all care be “reasonable and necessary.”219 Ultimately, when the 
provider submits a bill for the service that was neither reasonable nor 
necessary, the provider is allegedly making a false statement to the 
federal government.220 This argument would be a novel one; in this 
                                                                                                                  
 217. See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 703 (2d Cir. 2001) (“In a worthless services claim, 
the performance of the service is so deficient that for all practical purposes it is the equiva-
lent of no performance at all.”). 
 218. In a previous work, I suggested a new construct of health care fraud regulation in 
overtreatment cases—particularly with an eye toward improving the accuracy and defensi-
bility of medical necessity-based fraud regulation. In it, I argued that instead of linking the 
determination of fraud to whether or not the care at issue was medically necessary, federal 
prosecutors should be able to target individual providers simply by virtue of those providers 
exceeding a normal range of administered care as compared to other providers. For more 
arguments as to why this enforcement mechanism would be more accurate and defensible, 
see Buck, Caring Too Much, supra note 23, and Buck, Enforcement Overdose, supra note 23.  
 219. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (West 2015). 
 220. The False Claims Act prevents the “knowing[]” presentation of a false claim to the 
federal government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012). Interestingly, in 2007, Wennberg and 
his colleagues suggested a new definition of medical necessity; instead of using medical ne-
cessity as a species of decision made by the physician or payer, they argued that it should be 
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context, it has never been successful—and rarely been employed.221 
This is likely due to the fact that medical necessity has historically 
been conceived of as dependent on the determination of one of two ac-
tors in the care delivery chain: (1) providers222 and (2) payers (particu-
larly the Medicare program itself).223  
Whether or not the patient has evinced clear and complete informed 
consent has historically been irrelevant to the question of whether or 
not a procedure was medically necessary, creating the anomalous sit-
uation that care lacking in informed consent may not only be classified 
as medically necessary for purposes of Medicare reimbursement, but 
that the two values—informed consent and medical necessity—may 
inexplicably diverge.224 Most importantly, this theory would infuse 
medical necessity with a second requirement. Beyond the provider’s 
determination, a procedure can only be medically necessary following 
complete and robust informed consent, inclusive of a number of disclo-
sures. Under this new paradigm, medical care that is not appropriately 
consented to by the patient is care that is lacking in medical neces-
sity—and, consequently, fraudulent. 
This argument would steer clear of the broad prohibition and con-
cern illustrated by the Mikes case, most notably because in its dismis-
sal of Patricia Mikes’ allegations, the Second Circuit was clear to note 
that “ ‘medical necessity’ as used in the certification did not translate 
                                                                                                                  
“based on the patient’s preference, established through high-quality shared decision mak-
ing.” Wennberg et al., supra note 32, at 1569. Indeed, a newly conceptualized definition of 
medical necessity would prove quite revolutionary for these fraud-based theories. Absent a 
formal change here, however, the argument can still be made that care lacking in informed 
consent is not medically necessary. See SNELL, supra note 174; Pope, supra note 33, at 278 
(noting that unwanted medical treatment is not medically necessary, as “[w]hen a competent 
and informed patient or surrogate expressly declines treatment, such treatment cannot be 
considered ‘medically necessary’ ”) (citation omitted).  
 221. See, e.g., Gross v. AIDS Research All.-Chi., No. 01C8182, 2003 WL 22508153, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2003) (granting a motion to dismiss after relator was not specific enough 
with allegations, but one allegation centered on a failure to obtain informed consent for a 
clinical study); United States ex rel. Hartwig v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 3:11CV413-CWR-LRA, 
2014 WL 1324339, at *12 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2014) (dismissing claims based on a lack of 
informed consent because “payment of Medicare claims does not require informed consent”). 
 222. See Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability in 
Health Care, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 93, 103 (2006) (documenting the history 
of care providers’ control over the medical necessity determination and then the “provider-
dominated institutions [that] reviewed determinations of medical necessity made by  
providers”). 
 223. See Lester J. Perling, Medicare’s Medical Necessity Criteria: A Mystery in the Mak-
ing, HEALTH L., Oct. 2008, at 30, 32 (calling Medicare’s coverage and medical necessity de-
terminations “vague” and threatening to “providers’ and suppliers’ ability to practice and 
earn income”).  
 224. See generally D. Don Welch, Essay, Walking in Their Shoes: Paying Respect to In-
competent Patients, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1617, 1627 (1989) (admonishing that “[w]hen we think 
about treatment of incompetent patients without their consent, we should not think in terms 
of medical necessity overriding the value of informed consent”). 
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to a quality guarantee.”225 In Mikes, the certification—which indicated 
that a medically necessary and reimbursable procedure was adminis-
tered226—was a significantly different type of certification than the 
proposed certification for care that lacks informed consent. The  
Second Circuit made clear that “[t]he fact that the ‘quality’ of the  
tests might not have met the applicable standard of  
care . . . was irrelevant under the FCA.”227 For the instant proposal,  
if care is lacking in complete informed consent, the certification that 
the care was medically necessary would clearly be a false submission; 
a failure to achieve sufficient informed consent is not just a  
quality failure, it is a bedrock requirement before treatment may  
commence.228 
B.   Practical Impacts 
In many ways, this proposal signals a paradigm shift in the inves-
tigation and prosecution of health care fraud based on medical neces-
sity. Up to this point, enforcement has been the province of the federal 
prosecutor (and sometimes a relator under the FCA). The enforcement 
framework has featured a government-based standard and a provider 
seeking to defend herself, often arguing over the grayly-shaded con-
cept of medical necessity.  
The enforcement mechanism has not yet availed itself of this sepa-
rate and potentially viable legal alternative: that when patients are 
overtreated, they are subject to harm—and when they are adminis-
tered care that is unnecessary or unwanted, there must be an allega-
tion that the informed consent evinced by the patient—a vital and re-
quired showing before treatment may begin—was deficient. Freeing 
federal prosecutors to pursue this second avenue of liability makes the 
government reimbursement standard—often subject to criticism due 
to its arguable accuracy229—potentially irrelevant. 
To demonstrate the attractiveness of this new theory, it is worth-
while to provide a concrete example. As is the case for many medical 
necessity-based investigations, this illustration focuses on fraud-based 
settlements recently announced by the DOJ as well as newspaper in-
vestigations commenced following allegedly unnecessary cardiac 
stents and services.230 These cases provide apt examples of where the 
                                                                                                                  
 225. Devin S. Schindler, Pay for Performance, Quality of Care and the Revitalization of 
the False Claims Act, 19 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 387, 403 (2009). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Parmet, supra note 106, at 173. 
 229. See Buck, supra note 24, at 1288 (discussing the critique that Medicare reimburse-
ment determinations are often inaccurate and distorted). 
 230. See Reed Abelson & Julie Creswell, Hospital Chain Inquiry Cited Unnecessary  
Cardiac Work, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/business/ 
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protections of informed consent can provide a powerful platform from 
which to bring an FCA case for a federal prosecutor. These cases would 
feature an argument that, with evidence of being subject to unneces-
sary and nonbeneficial care, something about the informed consent 
that was achieved was deficient, giving the DOJ a second potential 
pathway to liability. 
Hampered by an unaddressed knowledge deficit, many of the pa-
tients treated at King’s Daughters,231 the North Ohio Heart Center,232 
Saint Joseph Hospital London,233 or any of the Hospital Corporation of 
America (“HCA”) hospitals under review,234 may not have known that 
the stents and other cardiac procedures they received were allegedly 
unnecessary. For example, these patients at both King’s Daughters 
and Saint Joseph would not have known that these entities were per-
forming cardiac procedures on patients who allegedly “did not need 
them,”235 nor would these patients know that the amount of stent 
placements in a suburb of Cleveland was allegedly many multiples 
higher than the national average.236 For HCA’s Bayonet Point Hospital 
patients, the simple fact that allegedly “as many as 43 percent of the 
355 angioplasty cases . . . were outside reasonable and expected medi-
cal practice”237—or that Bayonet Point allegedly administered angio-
plasty to patients whose blockages ranged from 33% to 53%, when typ-
                                                                                                                  
hospital-chain-internal-reports-found-dubious-cardiac-work.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; 
EMH Regional Medical Center and North Ohio Heart Center to Pay $4.4 Million to Resolve 
False Claims Act Allegations, DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao/ 
ohn/news/2013/04janemh.html [hereinafter EMH Regional Medical Center]; King’s Daugh-
ters Medical Center to Pay Nearly $41 Million to Resolve Allegations of False Billing for Un-
necessary Cardiac Procedures and Kickbacks, DEP’T JUST. (May 28, 2014), http://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/pr/king-s-daughters-medical-center-pay-nearly-41-million-resolve-allegations-
false-billing [hereinafter King’s Daughters Medical Center]; Saint Joseph London Hospital 
to Pay $16.5 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations of Unnecessary Heart Procedures, 
DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao/kye/news/2014/2014-01-28-sjhlon-
don.html [hereinafter Saint Joseph London Hospital]. 
 231. See King’s Daughters Medical Center, supra note 230. 
 232. See EMH Regional Medical Center, supra note 230. 
 233. See Saint Joseph London Hospital, supra note 230. 
 234. See Abelson & Creswell, supra note 230; see also Maria Armental, HCA Discloses 
Suit Alleging Unnecessary Procedures, False Billing Claims, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2015, 8:26 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hca-discloses-suit-alleging-unnecessary-procedures-false-
billing-claims-1425000382 (noting that HCA has recently disclosed a lawsuit has been filed 
based upon the medical necessity of its cardiology procedures and that the “federal investi-
gation continues”). 
 235. King’s Daughters Medical Center, supra note 230; Saint Joseph London Hospital, 
supra note 230. 
 236. See Abelson, supra note 44. 
 237. Abelson & Creswell, supra note 230. 
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ically cardiologists “do not operate on any blockage less than 70 per-
cent”238—would seem to be important facts that may have been un-
known by patients.  
On top of this, patients likely lacked information that stent place-
ments were no better than cheaper, less invasive therapies in prevent-
ing heart attacks in patients with stable coronary artery  
disease.239 Indeed, it is fair to assume that beyond the chest pains, the 
patients entering these institutions may have entered into the clinic 
without extensive knowledge as to what treatment was most clinically 
appropriate for their condition. As to the investigation where concrete 
facts exist—evidence of allegedly unnecessary procedures—an allega-
tion of FCA liability based on deficient informed consent is not only 
intuitive, but seemingly demanded.240 
Specifically, it seems reasonable to assume that a percentage of 
those patients—how many exactly remains unknown—would not have 
consented to undergoing a stent implantation or other cardiac proce-
dure had they been aware of the comparative information referenced 
above. Had the patients either known that these entities were alleg-
edly performing unnecessary cardiac procedures, or had the patients 
simply had access to comparative data (particularly that one of the 
institutions allegedly placed stents at four times the national rate241), 
then the consent those patients granted may not have been as clearly 
forthcoming. As a result, the consent the providers allegedly received 
in cases like these had to be at least partly deficient—had they pro-
vided reasonable alternatives, including the option of doing nothing, 
then a discernable subset of patients surely would have declined the 
procedures. Aside from the allegation that these cardiac procedures 
were unnecessary, the prosecutors could argue that the patients did 
not receive enough information to make an informed decision. 
In fact, for those patients, the provider’s disclosure may have been 
insufficient; for many clinically borderline cases, it may be that  
the provider failed to present all treatment alternatives—including,  
of course, the option of doing nothing. And had these hospitals  
been forced to (1) divulge information to prospective patients  
that included statistics on the comparative rate of stent placement, 
                                                                                                                  
 238. Id. 
 239. See Anahad O’Connor, Heart Stents Still Overused, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
15, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/heart-stents-continue-to-be-
overused/?_r=0. 
 240. Abelson & Creswell, supra note 230. 
 241. See Abelson, supra note 44. 
2016]  OVERTREATMENT AND INFORMED CONSENT 947 
 
 
(2) present the reasonable alternative of adopting a “wait and see” ap-
proach, or (3) encourage them to get a second opinion, these patients 
may not have elected to undergo the surgery.242 
Imagine that the doctrine of informed consent—here loosely termed 
“extended” informed consent—required the provider to disclose infor-
mation that stents or other interventions may not be as effective as 
initially thought. This could include comparative data—like evidence 
focused on the North Ohio Heart Center (“NOHC”) and that it alleg-
edly outpaced the Ohio and national averages of stent placement by 
multiples.243 Under an extended informed consent duty, the physician 
would be required to disclose this information to the prospective pa-
tient—or risk a DOJ investigation. 
It is plausible—perhaps probable—that a number of those patients, 
when informed that cardiologists at NOHC allegedly exceeded the na-
tional stent placement average,244 would decline intervention or, per-
haps, seek a second opinion from another provider. Of those who 
sought a second opinion, it would be fair to assume that a number of 
these patients may end up not undergoing a stent placement after be-
ing told of the potential risks, alternatives, and nonbeneficial clinical 
nature that accompanies stent placement.245 That many stents are 
overused—and that, for many patients, placing a stent allegedly came 
with more risks than simply doing nothing—may have been a convinc-
ing argument for the typical American patient.246 
And although the taxpayers who footed the bill for these allegedly 
unnecessary stent placements were harmed, the key achievement of 
these arguments would be the deterrent value they secure; providers   
                                                                                                                  
 242. Part of the unknowable problem here is how many patients—even with the infor-
mation at their disposal—would still have elected for the surgery. However, given the infor-
mation gleaned from studies focused on patients at the end of life, it is reasonable to assume 
that, when fully informed, a number of patients may not elect to undergo therapies. See 
supra notes 134-50 and accompanying text; see also Eisler & Hansen, supra note 13 (“A 1997 
study in the Journal of the American College of Surgeons looked at 5,601 patients recom-
mended for surgery and found that second opinions found no need for the operation in 9% of 
the cases. Among those who got the countervailing second opinion, 62% opted not to have 
the operation.”). 
 243. See Abelson, supra note 44. 
 244. The providers at NOHC not only exceeded the national average by four times, but 
exceeded the state average by three times. See id. 
 245. See Eisler & Hansen, supra note 13.  
 246. See Abelson, supra note 44. 
948  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:901 
 
in the future, when faced with burgeoning fraud-based arguments for 
failures to achieve extended informed consent, will be more cognizant 
of what they must disclose to the prospective patient.  
C.   Challenges Associated with Proof 
Besides the potential legal challenges that face the informed con-
sent-based regulatory regime, this theory would also need to overcome 
two practical challenges. This includes demonstrating important as-
sumptions that (1) patients truly desire less care, and (2) that reason-
able alternatives—including the possibility of doing nothing—are both 
knowable and known by providers. Assuming both of these factors are 
met, the application of this new theory seems quite beneficial. Again, 
the problems associated with proof regarding whether informed con-
sent was achieved are not the focus of this analysis. 
First, this legal argument relies on an assumption that fully in-
formed patients—that is, patients told of comparative utilization data, 
treatment patterns, as well as alternative therapies and, in many in-
stances, the viable option of doing nothing—will choose less care. For 
the federal government to allege that overtreatment administered is 
due to a failure of informed consent, and then allege that the failure of 
informed consent has actually translated the care at issue into fraud-
ulent care, the government needs to be able to demonstrate that the 
lack of informed consent actually led to the administration of the care. 
Had the alternate occurred—that is, would the patient have still cho-
sen the nonbeneficial care even when presented with all the disclo-
sures required under the new extended informed consent require-
ments, then the theory of liability loses all of its power.247 And there   
                                                                                                                  
 247. These scenarios should be at least anomalous, if not exceptionally rare. Whether or 
not patients can avail themselves of a nonbeneficial procedure raises a host of important 
questions beyond the scope of this analysis. 
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may be a reason to fear that even patients presented with additional 
and helpful information may not access the information to make more 
rational health care choices.248  
However, for cases like those featuring the allegedly unnecessary 
cardiac procedures summarized above,249 allegations of deficient in-
formed consent seem eminently supportable; without adequate infor-
mation regarding the lack of medical necessity of a certain procedure, 
the patient cannot possibly evince adequate informed consent. Where 
a hospital’s physician is performing angioplasties for which 76% of the 
procedures, after an outside review, may indicate “unwarranted car-
diac catheterizations and . . . needless[] . . . multiple procedures,”250 
this assumption—that patients do not want to be subjected to unnec-
essary cardiac procedures—seems unequivocally reasonable—and, 
perhaps, legally protectable. At the least, taxpayers should not be pay-
ing for these allegedly unnecessary stents—again, not necessarily be-
cause they did or did not comply with Medicare’s reimbursement 
standards, but because the patients who were operated on did not ad-
equately consent to the procedures. 
A second assumption that this legal strain is dependent upon is the 
assumption that this data is knowable and known by providers. Indeed, 
for providers to be required to disclose clinically reasonable alternatives—
particularly, to be aware of the overtreatment for which each provider 
himself is responsible—increased data sharing must occur.251 Again, for 
the most egregious cases, this data is not easy for patients to attain; as 
early as 2004, an internal memorandum at HCA allegedly highlighted 
                                                                                                                  
 248. To this point, even when made available to them, American patients do not review 
cost and quality data. See CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM, THE STATE OF THE ART OF PRICE 
TRANSPARENCY TOOLS AND SOLUTIONS 5 (2013), http://www.catalyzepaymentreform.org/ 
images/documents/stateoftheart.pdf. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers, “31 percent of 
U.S. consumers reported reading online reviews of doctors.” Id. A separate study found that 
where 98% of health insurance plans provide a cost calculator tool, only 2% of patients use 
them. Id. Beyond the concerns associated with a failure to pay attention to the costs of a 
given procedure, however, patients may not pay attention to the risks and lack of benefits 
associated with a procedure. The “better safe than sorry” patient may not actually care about 
the potential health risks—and simple nuisance—that come with unnecessary medical ser-
vices. 
 249. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 250. Abelson & Creswell, supra note 230. 
 251. See Buck, supra note 24, at 1283-89 (noting the importance of increased data shar-
ing to providers for new enforcement techniques under the FCA). 
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the fact that a substantial percentage of angioplasty procedures per-
formed at Bayonet Point were not supported by foregoing medical prac-
tice standards.252 But the hospital did not disclose this fact to patients.253 
As a general matter, placing the burden on the profession itself—
that is, requiring it to be aware of the amount each provider is exceed-
ing the general clinical standard—may not be a costly or negative de-
velopment. In a modern health care delivery system that features so 
much unnecessary care, perhaps it is time for the providers to have 
general practice patterns impacted. At the very least, these data should 
influence the amount of information they disclose to a patient who is 
considering a health procedure. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
While the current legal pathway may be unclear, a theory of liabil-
ity under the FCA based upon a lack of informed consent could serve 
as an important and plausible legal construct in the fight against over-
treatment. Over the years, a number of solutions have been attempted 
to limit or reduce the incentives that are cemented into the reimburse-
ment structure, but American patients still undergo a stunning 
amount of unnecessary services and are subject to a startling amount 
of overtreatment each year. The distaste of this reality is made all the 
more surprising when surveys demonstrate that the majority of Amer-
icans do not want these services, to say nothing of the financial conse-
quences and risk of harm involved.  
This analysis lays the groundwork for an informed consent-based 
claim under the FCA, recognizing the potential current challenges that 
would exist in bringing one forward. However, the proposal has an in-
tuitive attractiveness to it, largely because it seeks to align the univer-
sally supported ideal of robust informed consent with the financial ne-
cessity of limiting overtreatment. Indeed, this solution does not depend 
on government-determined medical necessity conclusions, a federal 
prosecutor’s conception of good medical care, or a third-party payer or 
HMO’s desire to increase profits. Basing an enforcement mechanism 
on informed consent—the ultimate patient-protective doctrine—is at-
tractive because it places the American patient at the center of its ap-
plication while seeking to do two important things: to protect both that 
patient from unwanted medical care and to protect the American tax-
payer from the costly problem of overtreatment. 
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